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SUMMARY 
Conflicting predictions of performance under continuous 
reinforcement and intermittent reinforcement provided by expec­
tancy and operant approaches to motivation were tested using 
a within-subject design. Subjects performed a complex coordi­
nation task with manipulations of feedback and instructions 
with money or nonredeemable points serving as reinforcers. 
Different variables predicted trends in the data depending on 
the type of reinforcer used. Expectancy variables and equations 
did not account for trends in the data nor a significant amount 
of the response variance. Decrements in response rate were 
attributed to a loss of information associated with intermit­
tent reinforcement schedules instead of having a motivational 
basis. An ability measure multiplied by perceptions of equity 
of payment was the best predictor of performance, suggesting 
support for generalizations from operant experiments with some 
supplementing by a motivational construct. 
CHAPTER I 
THE HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BASES OF RESEARCH 
IN INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVE SYSTEMS 
The notion of directly tying reward to performance to 
improve performance in a work setting is certainly not a novel 
one, nor have the results been consistent and easily interpret-
able. Advances in experimental technology and methodology 
have only relatively recently allowed an investigation of the 
results of such practice in a scientific manner. Such inves­
tigations have led to an attempt to quantify human motiva­
tion levels to allow for reliable prediction of performance. 
As could be expected, prediction of motivation becomes a very 
complex process when one considers the many factors which 
first must be considered as primary influences of behavior 
and then must be considered as they interact. Determinants 
of motivation can theoretically be within the organism as 
well as within the environment. 
Various approaches to the prediction of motivation 
place different emphasis on the role of such determinants. 
One such approach has been labeled "expectancy theory" and 
is the most widely cited approach to motivation measurement 
in industrial-organization literature. It emphasizes subjec­
tive perceptions of the value of outcomes and the subjective 
probability of attainment of those outcomes. 
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Another approach to the prediction of work behavior has 
its foundation in operant technology and its associated labora­
tory results. The operant approach has often been characterized 
by its lack of use of cognitive constructs, rather than basing 
prediction of future behavior on the observation of past beha­
vior and the organism's interaction with the environment. 
Both expectancy theory and the operant approach have 
value in the prediction of work behavior. In some instances 
they predict conflicting results for particular situations, 
and those instances should be investigated. In some instances 
they can perhaps be combined to enhance the prediction of 
performance. And in some instances, they should perhaps 
"borrow" from other theories for prediction of motivation to 
increase their power. 
The initial question is whether incentive plans actually 
work. Studies undertaken in industrial settings suggest that 
under proper conditions the possibility of significantly in­
creasing production with the implementation of a monetary in­
centive system is well worth considering. Wyatt's (1934) 
classic study reported results in a work organization in which 
the employees were switched from the typical fixed weekly pay 
system to a competitive bonus system related to individual 
productivity. Production increased 46% and this level of per­
formance was maintained for fifteen weeks. A piece-rate system 
was then introduced which caused a further increase in pro­
duction of 3 0%. This level was maintained for twelve weeks, 
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which marked the end of the study. 
Viteles (1953) reported a study in which the employees 
were switched to an individual incentive plan. The results 
showed a plant-wide increase in production of 16% as well as 
lowering the accident rate and increasing cooperation with the 
supervisors. Studies of this nature are often confounded by 
concurrent changes in the system which accompany such changes 
in policy. However, in the case of the Western Electric 
studies (Roethlisberger and Dickinson, 1939), no other changes 
were implemented except the variation in pay allotment. The 
production increase was 16%. 
Subjects performing tasks in laboratory settings, when 
told that the amount of money they would earn would be depend­
ent on the effectiveness of their performance, have demonstra­
ted a higher level of performance (Atkinson and Reitman, 1956; 
Atkinson, 1958; Kaufman, 1962). Cherrington (1973) reported 
that subjects who were rewarded for performance not only indi­
cated greater satisfaction with their pay but also greater 
satisfaction with their fellow workers, supervisors, and the 
task itself. 
Expectancy Approaches to Work 
Incentive Systems 
The most widely cited attempt to construct a performance 
formula is that suggested by Vroom (1964) which has its roots 
in the works of Tolman (1932) and Lewin (1935, 1938) and 
states: 
4 
where 
V. 
3 
I 
V k 
n 
Motivation = E x ZIV 
where E = expectancy, I = instrumentality, and V = valence. 
This model is actually a combination of two other models sug­
gested by Vroom (1964). The first is his valence model: 
n 
v . = f z ( v I ) 
D k=l K D * 
the valence of outcome j 
the cognized instrumentality of outcome j for 
the attainment of outcome k 
the valence of outcome k 
the number of outcomes 
Perceived instrumentality is defined conceptually by 
Vroom as the degree to which the person sees the outcome in 
question as leading to the attainment of other outcomes. 
Valence is the perceived or anticipated value of an outcome 
to the individual (Lewin, 1938; Tolman, 1959). 
The second model predicts the force toward behavior: 
n 
F. = E (E. .V.) 
where 
F^ = the force on the individual to perform act i 
E ^ = the strength of the expectancy that act i will 
be followed by outcome j 
5 
V. = the valence of outcome j 
3 J 
n = the number of outcomes 
The concept of force is a Lewinian concept similar to Tolman's 
performance vector (1959), Atkinson's aroused motivation 
(1958), Luce's new subjective expected utility (1962), and 
Rotter's behavior potential (1955). 
Vroom defines the individual's expectancy as his belief 
concerning the probability that the behavior in question will 
be followed by the outcome of interest. While expectancies 
are perceived probabilities (action - outcome), instrumen­
talities are perceived correlations (outcome - outcome) 
(Mitchell, 1974) . 
Camann and Lawler (1973) choose to expand the composite 
model to provide greater explanation. 
Motivation = (E P) x E [ (P + 0) (V)] 
where E = effort, P = performance, 0 = outcome, and V = 
valence. (E •> P) is equivalent to Vroom's expectancy and 
is the belief that successful performance is possible if 
effort is expended. Graen (1969) describes this portion of 
the equation as a person's perception (subjective probability) 
of how his actions may be related to the attainment of first-
level outcomes. Although expectancy may be the least inves­
tigated of the variables found in the complete model, most 
evidence seems to support its usefulness. Studies by Schuster 
Clark, and Rogers (1971), Arvey (1972), and Motowidlo, Loehr, 
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and Dunnette (1972) all similarly conclude that individuals 
with low expectancies perform lower than subjects with high 
expectancies. The role of expectancy was demonstrated by 
House (1971) wherein managers who increased expectancies got 
increased responsiveness to incentives. Less direct evidence 
comes from studies in which expectancy and instrumentality 
are combined into an effort-outcome (E -* 0) measure. Studies 
using this measure (Hackman and Porter, 1968; Lawler and 
Porter, 1967; Porter and Lawler, 1968) report positive rela­
tionships between this composite and performance. Negative 
evidence is reported by Pritchard and Sanders (1973) who 
reported a correlation of .14 between expectancy and self-
reports of effort. 
Vroom conceptualized expectancy as a probability and 
it is usually measured as one. Most -commonly it is treated 
as a probability with values from .00 to 1.00 (Arvey, 1972; 
Holmstrom and Beach, 1973; Mitchell and Pollard, 1973; 
Pritchard and Sanders, 1973). 
(P 0) is equivalent to Vroom* s instrumentality, the 
belief that a given performance will be instrumental in 
attaining a given outcome. That is, a person's attitude 
toward an occurrence (outcome) depends on his perception of 
how that outcome is related (instrumental) to the occurrence 
of other more or less preferred consequences (Graen, 1969). 
Whereas expectancy involves variables internal to the opera­
tor and perhaps the man-machine interaction, instrumentality 
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involves the more complex interactions stemming not only from 
his work personality but also from his work role (Graen, 
1969), thereby involving the effects of his interaction with 
his co-workers. Schwab (197 3) reports the highest instrumen­
tality perceptions for piece-rate workers followed by group 
incentive workers, and lowest for hourly-paid employees. Yet 
Schwab and Dyer (197 3) report that instrumentality is not 
related significantly to performance, although valence and 
expectancy perceptions are. 
Experimental attempts to manipulate instrumentality have 
produced mixed results. Jorgenson, Dunnette, and Pritchard 
(197 3) were able to manipulate instrumentality in a temporary 
organization formed for experimental purposes. The results 
indicated a higher level of performance for individuals in a 
high instrumentality (piece rate) system than for those in 
a low instrumentality (hourly) system. Yet. Arvey (197 2) com­
pared subjects who had a .75 probability of earning extra 
participation points (high instrumentality) with those who 
had a .25 probability (low instrumentality) and found no dif­
ference in performance. Most researchers treat instrumentality 
as a probability, much like expectancy (Mitchell, 1974). 
Valence represents the third major variable found in 
Vroom's prediction equation. Valence is defined as ". . . 
affective orientations toward particular outcomes" (Vroom, 
1964), or the degree of desirability of an outcome for an 
individual. The valence of an outcome can be positive. 
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negative, or neutral. Its directionality is based on indivi­
dual preference for a designated outcome. Pritchard and 
Sanders (1973) report valence to be the best single predictor 
of performance, rather than expectancy, instrumentality, and 
all multiplicative and additive groupings of these factors. 
On the negative side, Hackman and Porter (1968) found a median 
correlation of .16 between measures of performance and valence 
outcomes in a survey of telephone operators. 
Valence measures should range from positive to negative, 
although few studies use this format (Vroom, 1966; Dackler 
and Mobley, 1973; Galbraith and Cummings, 1967; Mitchell and 
Nebeker, 1973; Pritchard and Sanders, 1973). More commonly 
used are scales with all positive values. 
Porter, Lawler, and Hackman (1975) report that research 
on the importance of rewards suggests that promotion and pay 
are the most highly valued extrinsic rewards that organiza­
tions have to offer. But pay is most often the choice for 
reward systems due to its flexibility as compared to promotion. 
The valence of pay is subject to great individual differences 
as well as moderating influences over time. On one level, 
Marriott (1957) points out that in countries where the stan­
dards of living are high, the basic necessities of life do 
not act as strong motivating forces except in times of severe 
economic depression. In such countries the problem is that 
of maintaining a standard of living instead of securing the 
basic needs of existence. There is the possibility that the 
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incentive valence may decrease in strength as it becomes more 
removed from the primary needs. 
Numerous attempts have been made to identify individual 
differences in pay valence among employees. Dalton (1948) 
distinguished between people for whom pay is important ("rate-
busters") and those for whom it is less important ("rate-
restrictors"). He observed the rate-busters to be country-
born, lone wolf. Republican, money saving, and investing 
workers without outside interests. The restrictors were found 
to be city-born, gregarious. New Deal Democrat, spending 
workers. Lawler's (1971) blue collar data demonstrated that 
men have a higher pay valence than women and that married 
individuals have higher pay valence than single individuals. 
Yet Schwab (197 3) found no valence correlation with sex, age, 
or amount of payment. He also did not find a valence differ­
ence between piece-rate and group incentive workers but he 
did find a slightly higher valence for both these groups over 
the hourly workers. There are other factors which can in­
fluence pay valence, perhaps accounting for reports that 
variations in the amount of reward have no consistent effects 
upon performance by human subjects (Bruning, 1964; Elliott, 
1966; Lewis and Duncan, 1961). Lawler (1973) suggests that 
the importance of pay is influenced by pay satisfaction, job 
level, and pay determination. Klein and Maher (1966) reported 
an increase in pay dissatisfaction as education level 
increases. It has also been shown that effective performance 
10 
itself may constitute a reward as well as a means to the 
attainment of reward (Lowell, 1952; Atkinson and Raphelson, 
1956). It is also possible that there may be a substantial 
discrepancy between the anticipated satisfaction from an 
outcome (i.e., its valence) and the actual satisfaction that 
it provides (i.e., its value). 
According to the equity theory proposed by Adams (1963, 
1965), an individual must make an evaluation of his input-
output balance of a "comparison other" (Lawler, 1973). A 
rational process of valence determination was suggested by 
Wyatt, Frost, and Stock (1934) from their findings that out­
put seems to become stabilized at a level which is propor­
tional to the strength of the monetary incentive. 
The Role of Ability and the Criterion 
A variable not included in Vroom's model is ability; 
yet he states that ". . . a worker's level of performance 
on his job is dependent both on his ability and on his moti­
vation" (1964, p. 198). Ability factors could include: 
1) the probability that the worker will discriminate between 
stimuli requiring different responses, 2) the worker's 
knowledge of the correct response to perform to each stimulus, 
and 3) the worker's capacity to execute the correct response 
(Vroom, 1964). Vroom (1964) suggests an interaction between 
ability and motivation of the following nature: 
Performance = f (Ability x Motivation) 
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House, Shapiro, and Wahba (1974) point out that such a formula 
would indicate that when ability has a low value, increments 
in motivation will result in smaller increases in performance 
than when ability has a high value. Similarly, when motiva­
tion has a low value, increments in ability will result in 
smaller increases in performance than when motivation has a 
high value. Yet Heneman and Schwab's (1972) review indicates 
that in most studies ability is unrelated to performance. 
Methodological limitations may account for the lack of posi­
tive results. 
When the discussion of ability, effort, and performance 
is begun, the question of the suitable criterion for the model 
must be answered before the literature can be surveyed for 
tests of the composite expectancy model. The model attempts 
to predict choice or effort, with most research activity be­
ing directed at the latter. In most cases, effort has been 
estimated in terms of self, peer, or supervisor ratings 
(Mitchell, 1974). The problem becomes one of providing a 
universally accepted definition and description of what 
"effort" specifies. Effort is a continuous dimension which 
is very hard to define. 
Even if some definition can be agreed upon, the use 
of ratings is beset by many problems. When the supervisor 
is the rater, the most serious problem may be one of oppor­
tunity to observe (Campbell and Pritchard, 1976). When self-
ratings are used, the individual must provide the ratings of 
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both the independent (expectancy, instrumentality, and va­
lence) and dependent variables. Any correlation could be 
possibly due to large increments of a common method variance 
(Campbell and Pritchard, 1976). 
In view of the problems inherent in the use of ratings, 
many researchers attempt to use performance measures as the 
criterion. Yet Vroom clearly distinguished between effort 
and performance. As noted earlier, Vroom (1964) generated 
an entirely separate model for the prediction of performance, 
as did Lawler and Porter (1967). Many studies continue to 
use a performance criterion for a model which is meant to 
predict effort. 
Results Using the Complete Model 
Mitchell (1974), Wahba and House (1974), and Campbell 
and Pritchard (1976) have among them thoroughly sampled the 
available literature on use of the expectancy model as a 
predictor of behavior. The consensus is that correlations 
with performance or independent ratings of effort can be 
expected to usually fall at or below the .30 level. Wahba 
and House (1974) do report that concurrent and predictive 
validity coefficients using the model range from .72 for 
prediction of job satisfaction (Mitchell and Albright, 1972) 
to as low as .11 for prediction of performance (Lawler and 
Porter, 1967). Campbell and Pritchard (1976) note that vir­
tually the only time that correlations exceed the .30 level 
is when self-rated effort is the criterion. As noted 
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earlier, these correlations may be inflated by method vari­
ance, which makes their interpretation very tenuous. Campbell 
and Pritchard also have come to the conclusions that: 1) the 
multiplicative model only slightly improves on predictions 
using the individual components alone, and 2) brief aptitude 
or general intelligence tests usually account for more vari­
ance than the motivational variables when a simple repetitive 
task is used as the dependent variable. 
Refinement of the Vroom Model 
These determinants of behavior have promise for the 
prediction of future behavior upon the manipulation of rele­
vant factors in the work setting. As is found in many 
attempts to quantify behavior as Vroom has attempted to do, 
the equations are too simplistic to predict behavior reliably 
across all settings. Two attempts to improve the predict­
ability of the model would be: 1) studying the interaction 
of the relevant variables and 2) basing predictions on past 
behavior. Jablonsky and DeVries (1972) suggest that focus 
on the interaction effects gives a stronger prediction of 
human behavior. Many interacting variables have been concept­
ualized and shown to affect production. Marriott (1957) 
listed fifteen variables which he believes can interact to 
influence the effect of incentive pay systems. These vari­
ables are grouped into three categories: situational deter­
minates, intra-individual determinants, and multiple reward 
contingencies. 
14 
Marriott's list accounts for many of the determining 
factors but is by no means exhaustive. Pritchard and Curtis 
(1973) found goal-setting to be a factor in influencing perform­
ance, although not a necessity for good performance. This sug­
gests the possibility that establishing objectives may satisfy 
secondary needs of achievement and recognition. The positive 
effect of goal-setting on performance and satisfaction has been 
shown in laboratory studies (Hamner and Harnett, 1974; Ilgen 
and Hamstra, 1972; Locke, 1968; Locke, Cartledge, and Knerr, 
1970) and in at least one field study (Latham and Kinne, 1974). 
Ronan, Latham, and Kinne (1973) report that goal-setting has a 
positive effect on performance in an industrial setting only 
when accompanied by supervision. Heiman (1975) believes that 
the value of the source of an outcome can influence the value 
of the outcome in conflict situations, like those which may be 
a product of management-peer disagreement. 
In relation to Vroom's formula (M = E x £ IV), Matsui 
and Terai (197 5) found an interaction between the E and IV 
components such that individuals with a high IV score are more 
influenced by expectancy variations than are those individuals 
with low IV scores. Other interesting factors have been shown 
to be need for achievement (French, 1955), knowledge of results 
(Ammons, 1953; Bilodeau and Bilodeau, 1961; Braunstein, Klein, 
and Pachla, 1973; Hundal, 1969), and reliable information 
about the plan (Camann and Lawler, 1973). The role of groups 
is also worth consideration. Lower productivity with 
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increases in group size (Marriott, 1949) has been shown to be 
due in part to the decrease in the relationships individuals 
"see" between pay and performance (Campbell, 1952). Yet, 
groups can encourage cooperation and eliminate problems found 
in individual incentive plans such as restrictive norms and 
competition. 
House et al. (1974) have suggested an alternative pre­
diction formula which states: 
Motivation = f{lV, + E[IV + Z(IV)]} 
D a 
where 
V = Valence 
I = Instrumentality 
E = Expectancy 
IV = Intrinsic Valences of Accomplishment; those 
a 
associated with task accomplishment, such as 
pride in the work or the satisfaction of achiev­
ing a challenging goal. 
IV, = Intrinsic Valences of Behavior; those associated b 
with task performance, such as the development 
of valued skills or social satisfaction. 
Berger, Cummings, and Heneman (1975) tested a somewhat 
simpler version of the above formula: 
Motivation = f(IV + IV, + E + I + V) 
a D 
This combination of variables was found to be significantly 
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(p < .01) related to performance in one time period using a 
secretarial task with females over an extended period of time. 
Wyatt (1934) suggested one other factor which has since 
been shown to be important in behavioristic studies, that 
factor being the role of rate of responding and rate 
dependency. Wyatt was able to show that increased motivation 
resulting from the use of economic incentives had a greater 
effect on the level of performance of those who were initially 
performing at a relatively high level than on those who were 
initially performing at a relatively low level. 
Money as a Reinforcer 
An "incentive" has been defined by English and English 
(1958) as "an object or external condition, perceived as cap­
able of satisfying an aroused motive that tends to elicit 
action to obtain the object or condition." Much of the dis­
cussion centers on a definition of the "aroused motive." A 
widely held hypothesis is that money acts as a generalized 
conditioned reinforcer because of its repeated pairings with 
primary reinforcers (Holland and Skinner, 1961; Kelleher and 
Gollub, 1962; Skinner, 1953). Skinner (1953) stated that 
such a generalized reinforcer should be extremely effective 
because some deprivation will usually exist for thich the 
conditioned reinforcer is appropriate. As an example, 
Skinner (1953) showed that, using rats and a T-maze, a goal 
box paired with both food and water deprivation (wet mash 
being the reinforcer) proved to be a more effective reinforcer 
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than different goal boxes paired with either food or water 
deprivation. The analogy is made between the wet mash and 
money, both supposedly acting as generalized reinforcers. 
One problem with this example is that the difference in 
reinforcing quality was actually quite small in the above 
experiment. 
Dollard and Miller (1950) claimed to have shown that 
repeated pairings of money with primary reinforcers estab­
lish a new learned drive for money. They attempted to illu­
strate this by using monkeys working for tokens (poker chips). 
The monkeys would work for tokens but not unexpectedly refused 
to work when given a free supply of chips. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that the act of obtaining the chips serves as a 
drive reducing function. Yet token studies pair poker chips 
only with the association with removing a deprivation in a 
single primary area (food) while money is valued independent 
of any particular state of deprivation (Opsahl and Dunnette, 
1966) . 
Support for money as a generalized reinforcer is 
limited and inconclusive. Equally inconclusive are more theo­
retical approaches to the question of the properties money 
possesses. Vroom (1964) sees money as an "instrument for 
gaining desired outcomes." That is, if money is perceived by 
a given person as instrumental to obtaining security, and if 
security is desired, money itself acquired positive valence. 
Brown (1953, 1961) sees money as an "anxiety reducer," 
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suggesting that one becomes anxious in the presence of cues 
signifying the absence of money and money produces cues for 
the cessation of anxiety. There seems to be no proof for this 
theory as of yet. Perhaps money is a "hygieme factor" 
(Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman, 1959). This theory would 
suggest that money serves as a potential dissatisfier, but 
not as a satisfier. Therefore the main value of money is that 
it leads to both the avoidance of economic deprivation and 
the avoidance of feelings of being treated unfairly. There 
is no conclusive evidence to support this theory either 
(King, 1970). 
Operant Approaches to Incentives 
The current literature suggests operant technology as 
a means for improving behavior prediction. Heiman (197 5) 
points out that the reinforcing properties of an outcome 
resemble "valence" and the contingency between behavior and 
rewards resembles "expectancy." The ahistorical problems 
found in cognitive expectancy theories can be bypassed in 
favor of various reward contingencies. Expectancy theories 
make no reference to past behavior and only consider the 
state of the organism at the moment. An "operant" strategy 
would add empirical evidence and historical referent to the 
concepts of expectancy and valence. Heiman 1s rationale is 
that predictability would be increased since past performance 
and the interaction with the environment are the most valid 
and reliable predictors of future behavior. Jablonsky and 
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DeVries (197 2) believe that three things are needed for pre­
diction of behavior: 1) historical relationships between 
the individual and administering agent, 2) strength of rein­
forcers, and 3) schedules of reinforcement. They cite the 
advantages also mentioned by Heiman (1975) as well as the 
utilization of definitions of reward and punishment. 
The reported failure to demonstrate success with op­
erant methods in industrial settings may be due to many things, 
the most basic of which may be the notion that Skinnerian 
applications may be too general or simple to apply to complex 
social situations and complex social organisms. Modest 
results have been obtained showing better performance under 
variable ratio schedules over continuous reinforcement sche­
dules in laboratory settings (Yukl, Wexley, and Seymour, 
1972). In addition, a field experiment revealed that con­
tinuous reinforcement produced higher productivity than two 
variable ratio schedules with equal reinforcement probabili­
ties (Yukl and Latham, 1975). Such a finding presents a basis 
for questioning the generalizability of operant data obtained 
from laboratory situations using animals. Beginning with the 
reports of Ferster and Skinner (1957), such data has consis­
tently shown intermittent reinforcement to be superior to 
regular or continuous reinforcement when examining rate of 
response, error rate, and resistance to extinction. For 
example, using chimpanzees and a complex response, Ferster 
(1958) reported that behavior was maintained considerably 
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more accurately under intermittent reinforcement than under 
continuous reinforcement. Sidman (1960) believes that 
"(E)ven though intermittancy does not have the same quanti­
tative effect in all cases . . . the fact that the variable 
is so widely effective is an important generalization" (p. 57). 
Results such as those reported by Yukl and Latham 
(1975) in a field study could present a serious problem for 
those who wish to generalize laboratory findings like those 
reported above to industrial situations. As Campbell and 
Pritchard (197 6) note, the expectancy model would assert that 
the greater the individual's instrumentality, the greater the 
effort expended, other things being equal." However, on 
their face the laboratory data on reinforcement schedules 
do not support this assertion and any garden variety Skinnerian 
would opt for a probability considerably less than 1.0" 
(Campbell and Pritchard, 1976; p. 84). Explanations for such 
findings could include: 1) it may be true that social situ­
ations add dimensions that counteract schedule effects, 
2) both studies actually used mixed schedules where the in­
centive was used in addition to the typical hourly wage, and 
3) the field study used manual laborers whose level of edu­
cation (and perhaps intelligence) was lower than that of the 
subjects employed in laboratory studies which used college 
students. 
Another possibility is that Vroom's model may actually 
be more applicable to complex work settings, since the 
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expectancy model would predict continuous reinforcement to be 
superior to any other schedule. The following study relates 
an investigation of such a possibility. 
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CHAPTER II 
A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The present study represents an alternate means of 
testing and explaining the major relationships proposed by 
expectancy and operant approaches to work incentive systems. 
Conflicting results in the literature will perhaps receive 
clarification through this laboratory experiment. Specifi­
cally, this study attempts to determine if expectancy approa­
ches or operant approaches better predict performance in a 
laboratory setting where environmental variables can be 
controlled and manipulated. 
Table 1 shows values for different reward congingen-
cies as explained by expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) and 
operant learning terminology. Expectancy (E) is shown as the 
objective probability that a reward will be given for a 
single response. In situations where the incentive plan is 
known and understood, this should equal the subjective prob­
ability of reinforcement. For illustrative purposes. Valence 
(V) is shown as +1, or 0, +1 being a positive valence usually 
associated with money. Force (F) or motivation is the product 
of the expectancy and valence components. 
It is evident from Table 1 that motivation should be 
greatest when expectancy is 1.0 and the valence is +1, 
assuming that ability and opportunity to perform are held 
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Table 1. Expectancy and Operant Treatments 
of Reinforcement Schedules 
E X V 1! F Schedule 
1.0 + 1 +1. 0 CRF 
0.5 + 1 + 0.5 VR2 
0.2 + 1 + 0.2 VR5 
0 + 1 0 Extinction 
1.0 0 0 No reinforcer 
Figure 1. Expectancy (a) and Operant (b) Predictions of 
Results of Changing from CRF to VR2 at Point t R 
(from Mawhinney and Behling, 197 3). 
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constant. This is the same as a continuous reinforcement 
(CRF) schedule in operant terminology. If expectancy is 
reduced to .5, the Force product is reduced, predicting poorer 
performance. This is analogous to a variable ratio (VR2) 
schedule in which the subject receives reinforcement with 
every two responses on the average. Operant experiments have 
repeatedly shown intermittent reinforcement, such as in a 
VR2 schedule, to be superior to regular reinforcement, such 
as in a CRF schedule in regard to rate of response, resis­
tance to extinction, and error rate (Ferster and Skinner, 
1957; Ferster, 1958; Sidman, 1960). 
Under the above conditions, expectancy and operant ap­
proaches predict conflicting results. Studies have been done 
to attempt to demonstrate which theory operates in experiments 
using human subjects. A laboratory study done by Yukl et al. 
(1972) showed the VR2 schedule to be superior to the CRF 
schedule, thereby supporting operant data. A field study by 
Yukl and Latham (1975) produced opposite results, supporting 
the expectancy model. Both studies have experimental design 
problems. The most important difficulty may lie in the treat­
ment of the subjects in which different groups are each given 
only one schedule exposure, either CRF or VR2. Mawhinney 
(1975) mentions that reinforcer values (valence) may differ 
among individuals and that operant principles apply to the 
individual. Therefore the between-subjects design may confound 
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schedule and reinforcer effects. Mawhinney (1975) believes 
that if the operant versus expectancy question is to be ade­
quately tested, a within-subject design is needed. 
Figure 1 shows what a within-subject design would pre­
dict from two approaches. If a CRF schedule is instigated at 
time tg and changed to a VR2 schedule at time t , expectancy 
theory would predict a decrease in performance while an oper­
ant explanation would predict an increase or at least mainte­
nance of response rate. 
As previously mentioned, expectancy can be equated with 
objective probability when the contingencies are understood 
by the subject. The question arises as to what variables and 
predictive approaches operate when such information is vague 
or withheld. Camann and Lawler (1973) state that for an em­
ployee to respond to an incentive plan, he must have under­
standable information as to the payoff structure. Motowidlo, 
Loehr, and Dunnette (1972) report a modest correlation of .29 
between objective probability of reward and subjective esti­
mates of expectancy when instructions as to payoff probability 
are withheld. Feedback as to performance can give varying 
degrees of information concerning contingencies depending on 
the amount of information the feedback provides as well as the 
perceptiveness of the subject. It must be determined if the 
effects of feedback (Ammons, 1953; Bilodeau and Bilodeau, 1961; 
Braunstein, Klein, and Pachla, 1973; Hundal, 1969) and the 
effects of instructions (Camann and Lawler, 1973) are due to 
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their roles in determining whether expectancy or operant 
approaches predominate, or are due to other factors. 
In addition to the effects of feedback and instructions, 
the present study also examined effects which might be attri­
buted to different reinforcers. In a simulated work environ­
ment, money would be the logical reinforcer. Under other 
conditions which have been shown to maintain responding, such 
as a game condition, nonredeemable points might be a sufficient 
reinforcer. Experiments using human subjects have used both 
forms of reward to test theories and maintain responding with 
little investigation of what the reinforcer actually is and 
what effects it might have on the results of the study. 
The experiment presented here uses a within subject 
design to examine operant and expectancy prediction of per­
formance under conditions where feedback, instructions as to 
reward contingencies, and types of reinforcers are manipulated 
as subjects respond under both CRF and VR2 schedules of 
reinforcement. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Sixty-four students (54 males, 10 females) at the 
Georgia Institute of Technology served as subjects. Descrip­
tive statistics are provided in Table 2. Thirty-two of the 
subjects received money for participation in the study, the 
amount of pay depending on performance. These students were 
recruited through the use of notices in the Psychology Depart­
ment and in the Student Center. The remaining subjects re­
ceived course credit for introductory psychology courses. 
Apparatus 
The primary task was performed on the Langley Complex 
Coordinator."'" The stimulus board is represented in Figure 2 
and rests at approximately eye level. It consists of four 
vertical pairs of rows of colored lights. Each pair is asso­
ciated with a limb of the body. For instance, the upper left 
pair of rows is controlled by forward and backward movements 
of a stick held in the left hand. The left hand columns in 
"''The apparatus used in this experiment was obtained 
through an equipment loan to Dr. R. M. Chambers from the Langley 
Research Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Hampton, Virginia. The psychomotor testing device used in the 
experiment is undergoing experimental test and evaluation, and 
is titled the Langley Complex Coordinator (NASA Control No. 
75315-1, NASA Inventory No. 152432). 
Table 2. Group Statistics for Variables Measured by the Questionnaire 
Variable Std. 
Name Explanation Mean Dev. Min. Max Notes 
EQUITY Fairness of pay 4.344 1.004 2.0 6.0 7 point scale; 
N = 32 
EFFORT Effort Rating 5.859 1.052 2.0 7.0 7 point scale 
EXPCTY Expectancy 4.922 3.282 0 10.0 
INSTY Instrumentality 6.391 3.481 0 10.0 
IVA Intrinsic value of 
task 3.500 1.469 1.0 7.0 7 point scale 
IVB Intrinsic value of 
performance 4.203 1.493 1.0 7.0 7 point scale 
NACH Need for achievement 15.484 4.213 8.0 25.0 
VALMONI Valence of money 31.563 8.085 3.0 48. 0 Pre-experimental 
measure 
VALMON2 Valence of money 2 31.734 7.499 10.0 48.0 Post-experimental 
measure 
SEX Sex of subject 1.156 .366 1.0 2.0 1 = male; 2 = female 
(5 4 males. 10 females) 
CLASS Year in school 2.344 1. 211 1.0 5.0 1 = Freshman 
5 = Grad. stud. 
VALGAMI Gambling Valence 1 16.266 4.701 2.0 24.0 Pre-experimental 
measure 
VALGAM2 Gambling Valence 2 15.594 4.879 0 24. 0 Post-experimental 
measure 
AGE Age of S 19.858 2.356 17.0 28. 0 
GPA Grade Point Average 2.675 .587 1.60 4.0 4 pt. scale, N=57 
SUPPORT Pet of school S 
pays for 48. 875 40.682 0 100.0 
to 
00 
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Figure 2. The Stimulus Board and the First Problem. 
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each pair of colored lights give the problems and are referred 
to as "problem lights." The lights in the right hand columns 
are activated through movements of hand sticks by each hand 
and floor pedals by each foot. Figure 2 illustrates the first 
problem given the subject as well as the correct answers. When 
the four white lights below the set of colored lights were 
activated, the subject had to move the manipulanda until the 
"moving" lights were one light, or step, below each problem 
light. For this problem, the blue light for the left arm was 
activated, requiring the lighting of the green light in the 
next column. When the correct answer was made for each set 
of lights, a new problem automatically appeared. For some 
problems the four white lights went off and the single white 
light in the middle came on. In this instance the subject had 
to match the lights one step above each of the problem lights. 
There were a total of 50 problems which were repeated. All 
subjects began with the first problem indicated in Figure 2. 
Immediately below the stimulus board were a counter and a 
buzzer. Programming and recording instruments were housed in 
a separate room from that used by the subjects. 
Procedure 
The subjects were seated at the Complex Coordinator 
Apparatus in an experimental room. They were told that 
instructions were to be given from the next room through a 
single speaker located a few feet away. The experimenter left 
the room and immediately gave the following instructions through 
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the speaker system. 
In front of you is the complex coordinator apparatus. 
Reach out with your left hand and grasp the left con­
trol stick. Move it forward and backward a few times. 
(Pause) Now move the stick until the moving light is 
one step below the light in the next column and hold 
it there. (Experimenter says "That's right" if the 
correct answer is made. If not, the preceding sen­
tence is repeated until the correct answer is made.) 
This is a correct match for the left arm when the four 
white lights are lit as they are now. Now take your 
hand away. 
A correct response is made for this machine when the 
four white lights are on by simultaneously moving the 
two sticks with your hands and the two floor pedals 
with your feet until all four lights are one step be­
low the colored problem lights in the next columns, 
just as you did with your left hand. When the single 
white light in the middle comes on, you must match the 
lights one step above each colored problem light. Let 
me repeat: when the four lights are on, match one 
step below each problem light. If, for instance, you 
are to match one step above the top light, the correct 
answer would be the bottom light. When you have cor­
rectly matched all four sets of lights, a new problem 
will automatically appear. When I say begin, you will 
work for five minutes after which I will tell you to 
stop and rest. Get ready,and begin. 
At this point the subject began working for a five 
minute unrewarded session. If the subject did not get an 
answer in the first 30 seconds, help was given, usually con­
sisting of telling the subject that "the correct answer for 
the left leg is the top light," since this transfer was not 
always understood (see Figure 2). The second problem was 
of the "matched above" nature. If no answer was given for 
any extremity for fifteen seconds, the subject was told, 
"you should now be matching one step above each light." No 
further help was given and all subjects proceeded well from 
here on. 
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Following the five minute session, the subject was 
given a two minute rest period. After the rest period, the 
subject was given five 10 minute sessions with 2 minutes rest 
between each session. During the first three sessions each 
correct response was worth one cent (or point). During the 
last two 10 minute sessions each correct response was worth 
one cent (point) 50 percent of the time on a random basis 
(Variable Ratio 2). Before beginning the next work period, 
he was given instructions depending on the experimental 
treatment. The design was a 2x2x2 factorial design with 8 
subjects per cell (one additional cell was added later and 
will be explained in the Results section). The first inde­
pendent variable determined if the subjects received 
performance-dependent money or non-redeemable points (subjects 
working for points received class credit regardless of 
performance). The second independent variable determined if 
instructions were given (I) or not given (NI). The third 
independent variable determined if feedback was given (F) or 
not given (NF). Below are the instructions for each cell in 
the money condition. Numbers before statements indicate 
which sessions the instructions precede. 
Group 1 (IF): 
1) When I say to begin, you will work for ten 
minutes. Each time you make a correct response, 
you will earn one cent. Each penny earned will 
be registered on the counter in front of you and 
a buzzer will sound like this . . . to tell that 
you have earned a penny. There is no limit to 
how much you can earn in the time given. 
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2,3) When I say to begin you will work for a ten 
minute session. 
4) During the next two ten minute sessions each 
correct answer will be worth a penny fifty per cent 
of the time. That is, there will be a 50-50 chance 
that you will get a penny with each correct response. 
When you earn a penny, it will still be registered 
on the counter and the buzzer will sound. When I 
say to begin you will work for a ten minute session. 
5) When I say to begin you will work for a ten 
minute session. 
Group 2 (I-NF): 
1) When I say to begin you will work for ten minutes. 
Each time you make a correct response you will earn 
one cent. A machine in the next room will keep track 
of how much you have earned and you will be paid at 
the completion of the experiment. There is no limit 
to how much you can earn in the time given. 
2,3) When I say to begin, you will work for a ten 
minute session. 
4) During the next two ten minute sessions, each cor­
rect answer will be worth a penny fifty per cent of 
the time. That is, there will be a 50-50 chance that 
you will get a penny with each correct response. A 
machine in the next room will keep track of how much 
you have earned. When I say to begin, you will work 
for a ten minute session. 
5) When I say to begin, you will work for a ten minute 
session. 
Group 3 (NI-F): 
1) You are going to be paid according to your per­
formance. The amount you receive will depend on how 
well you do. When I say to begin, you will work for 
ten minutes. A buzzer will sound like this . . . and 
the counter in front of you will operate to tell you 
that you have earned a penny. There is no limit to 
how much you can earn in the time given. 
2-5) When I say to begin, you will work for a ten 
minute session. 
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Group 4 (NI-NF): 
1) You are going to be paid according to your per­
formance. The amount of pay you receive will depend 
on how well you do. When I say to begin, you will 
work for ten minutes. A machine in the next room 
will keep track of how much you have earned and you 
will be paid at the completion of the experiment. 
There is no limit to how much you can earn in the 
time given. 
2-5) When I say to begin, you will work for a ten 
minute session. 
Subjects working for points instead of money received modified 
instructions with "points" replacing "money" references. A 
line was also inserted stating that the points were for the 
information of the subject only (i.e. nonredeemable). 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Questionnaire Contents and Item Reliability 
Questionnaires were administered to the subjects pre-
and post-experimentally to obtain demographic information as 
well as subject reactions to expectancy and motivation 
oriented questions. A pilot sample of nine subjects was 
tested twice with a one week interval to provide test-retest 
reliability estimates. These subjects received class credit 
and no pay for participation. A copy of the questionnaire 
is provided in Appendix A. 
All demographic variables proved to be perfectly reli­
able in a test-retest measure. These variables included sex, 
age, year in school, marital status, major, grade point aver­
age, financial aid, and percentage of schooling subject pays 
for. Correlations are test-retest measures unless otherwise 
noted. 
Equity; A seven-point scale was used post-experimentally to 
measure fairness of pay perceptions for those subjects who 
received money for participation (N=32). Test-retest reli­
ability was not obtained on this question exactly since the 
pilot subjects received no pay. Instead they were asked for 
judgments as to what fair pay should be considering the time 
and effort expended. Responses ranged from nothing (no pay) 
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to $10.00 with a mean of $4.13 (r = .93). 
Effort; A seven-point scale measured self-reports of effort 
expended (r = .64). 
Subjective Probability of Reinforcement; Subjects were asked 
post-experimentally for an estimate of the number of reinforce­
ments given on the average for every ten correct responses 
(r = -.57) . 
Expectancy; An expectancy measure was obtained post-
experimentally as the subjective probability (chances in 10) 
that an increase in effort would lead to better performance 
(r = .55). 
Instrumentality; Instrumentality was measured post-
experimentally as the subjective probability (chances in 10) 
that an increase in performance would lead to more pay (or 
more points) (r = .04). 
Intrinsic Valence of the Task: IV was measured post-
a 
experimentally using a seven point scale concerning the value 
of learning the task (r = .81). 
Intrinsic Valence of Accomplishment: IV^ was measured post-
experimentally using a seven-point scale concerning the value 
of doing well on the task (r = .90). 
Valence: The valence of 13 possible outcomes was measured 
both pre and post-experimentally. Each outcome was rated 
for its value on a 13-point scale ranging from -6 (Extremely 
Bad) to +6 (Extremely Good) with a neutral point of 0. Out­
comes included receiving money, class credit, recognition. 
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a good grade in a class, and nothing. Also included were 
outcomes measuring gambling valence. Six test-retest reli­
ability coefficients were calculated on the four adminis­
trations of the questionnaire to the pilot groups. Coeffi­
cients ranged from .76 (2-3) to .97 (1-4) with a median of 
.91. 
Need for Achievement; NACH was measured pre-experimentally 
using the 28 items selected from the Edwards Personal Pref­
erence Schedule (Edwards, 195 9) which measure need for achieve­
ment along with two randomly selected "dummy" questions. 
Scores were calculated as "Right" or "Wrong" on each item 
with a maximum score of 28 being possible. Test-retest 
reliability was calculated as .59 for this sample. Other 
studies reporting test-retest reliabilities for this index 
use time spans of 1 week and greater as follows: Edwards 
(1959), 1 week, r = .74; Horst and Wright (1959), 1 week, 
r = .83; Mann (1958), 3 weeks, r = .64; Caputo et al. (1966), 
15 months, r = .47. The Kuder-Richardson 20 reliability 
coefficient for the total sample of 64 subjects was .72. 
Analysis of the Effects of the 
Manipulated Variables 
The hypothesized result predicted by a multiplicative 
expectancy function, i.e., a decrement in performance upon 
changing schedules from CRF to VR2, is founded upon the idea 
that such a manipulation cuts the probability of reinforce­
ment in half and that such a manipulation should be reflected 
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in a reduction in the individual's perceptions of instrumen­
tality. Instrumentality is the subjective perception of the 
connection between performance and reward, usually measured 
in terms of the probability that a change in performance would 
be reflected in a change in reward. Although ratio schedules 
guarantee by definition that a change in performance will be 
reflected in a change in reward frequency, it is assumed that 
the subjective instrumentality should be reduced as the ratio 
increases. Subjects indicated instrumentality perceptions 
at the end of the experimental session by responding to the 
question: "What did you feel the chances were that an in­
crease in performance would lead to earning more money 
(points)? out of 10." If the experimental manipulation 
of schedule change had its predicted effect, those subjects 
who received feedback and/or instructions as to reward sche­
dule should have their instrumentalities lowered when com­
pared to subjects receiving no information. 
Table 3 shows that the predicted effect was obtained 
to some extent for those subjects who worked for money but 
not for those subjects who worked for nonredeemable points. 
In the money subsample, those subjects who received both 
types of information (feedback and instructions) showed sig­
nificantly (p < .005) lower instrumentality perceptions when 
compared to subjects who received only one type of information 
or no information at all as to reward schedule. No differen­
ces were found between the remaining three groups in the 
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Table 3. Mean Instrumentality Perceptions for Each Cell 
of the 2x2x2 Factorial Design 
MONEY 
F-I NF-I F-NI NF-NI 
Mean 2.375* 8.125 6.125 7.25 
2 
0 2.734 8.359 8. 609 8. 688 
POINTS 
Mean 6.125 7.375 6.125 7.625 
2 
a 
11.859 11.234 16.359 4. 984 
* 
Student's t statistic shows this value to be signifi­
cantly (p < .005) different from all seven other values. 
money subsample nor between all groups in the points subsample. 
It can also be shown that, in the case of those subjects who 
received money, individuals who received feedback had lower 
instrumentality perceptions than those who did not (t = 3.250, 
p < .005). 
These results suggest that those subjects who received 
money as reward used the information given through feedback 
and instructions, while those subjects to whom the informa­
tion only indicated the presence of nonredeemable points per­
haps treated this information as to be of extraneous value, 
reinforcement perhaps coming more from the task itself than 
from any manipulation on the part of the experimenter. 
Such an hypothesis as stated above can perhaps be 
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strengthened by asking subjects who received feedback, in 
particular in the form of the counter which kept track of 
their earnings, how much they had earned for the entire 
session. Upon leaving the experimental chamber, the first 
thing the subjects who received feedback were asked to do 
was to write down how many points/cents they had earned. 
Out of the 16 subjects in each group who had feedback, three 
(3) who received money gave inexact reports while eight (8) 
who received points gave erroneous reports. This again 
points to the possibility that the information provided may 
have been only of secondary importance to more of the sub­
jects who received points than to those who received money. 
Estimates for the frequency of reinforcement during 
VR2 underestimated the actual frequency for both the money 
and points subsamples. Mean estimates for the probability 
of reinforcement were .408 (r = .17, with objective proba­
bility) for the money subsample and .406 (r = .14) for the 
point subsample. Due to the use of the probability genera­
tor, the actual probability of reinforcement was not the same 
for each group. The average probability of reinforcement for 
the money subsample was .477 and .4 99 for the point sub-
sample. Thus a larger discrepancy was shown between subjec­
tive estimates of frequency of reinforcement and objective 
probability for those subjects working for points. 
The results reported concerning instrumentality 
perceptions and erroneous reports of earnings suggest that, 
41 
while both money earners and point earners give us valuable 
information about motivation in such experimental settings, 
it may be the money group alone which provides the greatest 
external validity when considering the roles of feedback and 
instructions in an incentive work program. For this reason, 
results will be provided for both the total sample and also 
for the money subsample by itself. 
Analysis of Response Curves 
In order to see if the change from CRF to VR2 had the 
result within subjects as predicted by expectancy theory, 
response totals for each of the five 10-minute sessions were 
examined. Descriptive statistics for the response measures 
are provided in Table 4. In its strongest interpretation, 
expectancy theory would predict an acquisition curve for the 
three CRF sessions with a progressive decline in responding 
for the two VR2 trials. A less strong interpretation might 
predict a motivation decrement, as indicated by a depression 
in the response rate, but allow for a continued acquisition 
function. 
Table 5 presents response totals for individual sub­
jects which might be interpreted as providing some support 
for expectancy theory predictions. Three (3) subjects seen 
to provide strong support for a motivation decrement result­
ing from the decrease in reinforcement probability, indicated 
by a lower rate in session 5 than in session 4. For one of 
Table 4. Group Statistics for Response Measures 
Variable 
Name Explanation Mean Std . Dev. Min Max 
ANSVR2 Answers during VR2 190. 234 37 .141 114. 0 270. 0 
ANSCRF Answers during CRF 235. 016 52 .864 102. 0 325. 0 
ANSTOT Answers during entire session 425. 250 87 .754 216. 0 595. 0 
ERRVR2 Errors during VR2 977. 524 240 .469 538. 0 2164. 0 
ERRCRF Errors during CRF 1250. 794 253 . 052 587. 0 1737. 0 
ERRTOT Errors during entire session 2228. 317 464 .010 1125. 0 3645. 0 
ABLTYA Ability in answers, 5 min. 
unreinforced responding 18. 328 CO
 
,325 1. 0 33. 0 
ABLTYE Ability in errors, 5 min. 
unreinforced responding 141. 844 45. 657 21. 0 232. 0 
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Table 5. Within-subject Support for Expectancy Theory 
from Response Totals During 5 10-Minute 
Sessions under CRF and VR2 
or CRF VR2 
Subject Money Condition 1 2 3 4 5 
223 M F-NI 51 64 72 61 60 
307* P NF-NI 63 74 83 82 81 
322* P F-NI 73 92 90 81 78 
MODERATE 
204 M F-NI 49 70 81 71 79 
214 M NF-I 64 86 101 97 99 
232 M F-NI 62 76 87 77 83 
301 P F-I 70 88 99 89 89 
313* P NF-NI 82 90 101 96 97 
315 P F-NI 63 72 74 66 69 
WEAK 
201 M F-I 61 71 86 82 95 
205 M F-NI 18 46 60 55 65 
216 M F-I 70 86 88 87 90 
222 M F-NI 83 95 102 99 104 
304 P F-NI 66 75 85 83 91 
308 P F-I 71 92 107 103 112 
312* P NF-NI 84 103 116 111 116 
323 P F-NI 70 87 97 94 100 
325 P F-I 50 67 83 80 88 
330 P NF-I 77 97 111 108 122 
331 P F-I 66 66 76 72 77 
The response curves for these subjects meet a priori require­
ments for possible support for expectancy theory, while other 
considerations suggest their exclusion from this table as 
true support. 
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these three subjects (307), the effect is just barely indi­
cated, with a ceiling effect being possible. In addition, 
this subject's data could not support expectancy theory since 
the condition he was in (NF-NI) did not provide information 
that reinforcement had been halved, as is also the case for 
subjects 312 and 313. In the case of Subject 322, the down­
ward trend actually began in session 3, suggesting an effect 
due to causes other than reduction of reinforcement probability. 
Thus only Subject 2 23 can provide good support for an expec­
tancy effect. Figure 3 shows this subject's total response 
curve for the odd numbered trials, a trial defined as a 30 
second interval. Reporting every other trial was chosen to 
reduce the variability in the graph. Since it is possible 
to work at a rate of 4.5 responses every 30 seconds, for 
example, recording response counts at these intervals would 
produce a series of 4,5,4,5 . . . Sampling every other trial 
therefore removes some of this variability to allow for easier 
identification of trends in the data. This subject's question­
naire data was also examined. No responses were especially 
unusual. Somewhat low reports were given for subjective prob­
ability of reinforcement (.3), instrumentality (.2), and 
expectancy (.3). 
The remaining cases given in Table 5 give moderate 
expectancy support where responses decrease in session 4 but 
increase in session 5, although still below the level achieved 
under CRF, and weak support in the cases where responding in 
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session 5 recovers to a level above that attained under CRF. 
The most noticeable result is that across these 20 cases, few 
(5 out of 20) given in Table 5 fell into the conditions in 
which feedback was not given. 
Group response curves are provided in Appendix C. 
Time-Series Analysis 
A time-series analysis, as described by Glass, Willson, 
and Gottman (1975) was applied to the data to test for effects 
on response rate caused by the change in reinforcement 
frequency. In the typical time series analysis, repeated 
observations are made on some variable over time. Between 
two of the observations an intervention is introduced. An 
abrupt change such as a change in level or change in drift 
direction which coincides with the intervention can often be 
attributed to that intervention. The bases for time-series 
experiments and their analysis is amplified further in 
Appendix D. 
Tables 6 and 7 show the t-statistics for the testing 
of significance for the design parameters (level change, 
drift, and drift change). The t-statistics are those asso­
ciated with the 9^ for each case where the error variance 
was at its minimum. Significance was tested at a = .05 with 
106 degrees of freedom. 
Of 64 subjects, 63 showed significant (p < .05) 
deterministic drift, the one exception showing positive drift 
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Table 6. Time-series Analysis for the Money Subsample 
Subject Condition Level Chg. Drift Drift Chg. 
1 F-l -1.677 6.749* -1.318 
2 NF-I -0.188 7.863* -3.267* 
3 NF-I -2.224* 7.656* -1.726 
4 F-NI -3.691* 8.422* -2.163* 
5 F-NI -3.780* 10.813* -1.741 
6 NF-NI -0.138 6.590* -1.734 
7 NF-NI -0.251 10.095* -4.692* 
CO
 
F-I -0.693 6.266* -3.733* 
9 NF-NI -0.255 6.118* -1.387 
10 F-I -0.955 5.646* -2.309* 
11 F-NI -1.131 3.127* -1.286* 
12 NF-NI 0.470 4.381* -1.774 
13 NF-NI -0.010 7.796* -3.389* 
14 NF-I -1.073 6.553* -2.858* 
15 F-NI -2.716* 7.665* -0.181 
16 F-I -2.128* 3.143* -0.880 
17 NF-I -0.648 7.956* -2.267* 
18 NF-I -0.639 4.856* -1.963 
19 NF-NI 0.674 2.957* -1.872 
20 F-I -0.039 5.543* -0.857 
21 NF-I 0. 068 5.362* -1.496 
22 F-NI -2.900* 6.643* -1.147 
23 F-NI -3.525* 6.102* -2.055* 
24 NF-NI -0.246 5.744* -2.003* 
25 F-I -1.146 6.837* -1.712 
26 F-NI -0.233 4.826* -0.904 
27 F-I -1.295 4.009* -1.687 
28 NF-I -0.888 7.802* -2.800* 
29 NF-NI 1.144 4.768* -1.819 
30 NF-I -1.645 8.794* -3.592* 
31 F-I -1.383 3.706* -1.098 
32 F-NI -4.052* 8.445* -2.089* 
Table 6a. Frequency of Time-series Effects (p < .05) 
for the Money Subsample. 
Level Change Drift Change 
Instructions Instructions 
Yes No Yes No 
Yes 1 6 Yes 2 3 
Feedback Feedback 
No 1 0 No 5 3 
p < . 05 
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Table 7. Time Series Analysis for the Point Subsample 
Subject Condition Level Chg. Drift Drift Chg. 
1 F-I -2.767* 4.683* -0.590 
2 NF-I -1.233 11.657* -3.609* 
3 NF-I -1.165 5.933* -0.853 
4 F-NI -1.990* 6.830* -1.842 
5 F-NI 0.174 5.418* -3.421* 
6 NF-NI -0.525 7.182* -3.057* 
7 NF-NI -0.475 2.600* -1.733 
8 F-I -3.450* 11.025* -2.880* 
9 NF-NI -2.498* 9.81.5* -2.525* 
10 F-I 0.234 8.250* -4.249* 
11 F-NI -0.655 2.684* -1.390 
12 NF-NI -1.294 2.395* -1.122 
13 NF-NI -2.793* 7.360* -2.236* 
14 NF-I -0.852 8.570* -2.820* 
15 F-NI -0.232 1.957 -1.237 
16 F-I 0.589 2.074* -1.398 
17 NF-I -0.324 2.842* -1. 502 
18 NF-I -1.736 8.030* -1.710 
19 NF-NI -0.776 6.569* -2.746* 
20 F-I -0.307 3.194* -1.462 
21 NF-I -1.405 8.349* -2.842* 
22 F-NI -1.466 4.405* -3.252* 
23 F-NI -2,487* 7.232* -1.680 
24 NF-NI -1.267 9.176* -2.709* 
25 F-I -2.445* 9.625* -2.626* 
26 F-NI -0.752 4.396* -2.207* 
27 F-I -0.276 4.770* -1.948 
28 NF-I -1.961 9.826* -2.595* 
29 NF-NI -1.166 10.423* -3.677* 
30 NF-I -1.662 4.204* -1.380 
31 F-I -0.841 3.625* -1.497 
32 F-NI -1.219 5.293* -0.364 
Table 7a. Frequency of Time-series Effects (p < .05) 
for the Points Subsample. 
Level Change Drift Change 
Instructions Instructions 
Yes No Yes No 
Yes 3 2 Yes 3 3 
Feedback Feedback 
No 0 2 No 4 6 
*p < .05 
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just shy of significance at the .05 level. Also shown are 
t-statistics for tests of level change and drift change. 
Of the 64 subjects, 57 showed a negative level change. Of 
these, 15 subjects had significant (p < .05) level changes, 
showing a pronounced and immediate drop in response rate at 
the point of intervention. Figure 4 is provided showing a 
response curve for a subject who showed a strong negative 
level change. No positive level changes were significant 
(p > .05). 
All subjects showed a negative drift change, a negative 
acceleration which could be predicted due to the ceiling 
effect in the acquisition curve. Pronounced changes in the 
acceleration of the function at the region of intervention 
were found for 29 of the subjects (p < .05), 13 who worked for 
for money and 16 who worked for points. Figure 5 is provided 
showing the response curve for a subject who showed a strong 
drift change. 
Tables 6a and 7a illustrates the factorial design of 
the study and the frequency count per cell of significant 
level change and drift change. Although the total number 
of subjects showing drift change and level change in the 
money and point conditions did not differ greatly, the cell 
frequencies show differences which should be accounted for. 
Of particular note are the two instances where 6 subjects 
working for money in the F-NI condition showed significant 
decreases in the rate of responding at the point of 
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Figure 4. Response Curve for Subject 232 (Money, F-NI) Showing 
Significant (t = -4.052, p < .001) Level Change. 
o 
Figure 5. Response Curve for Subject 207 (Money, NF-NI) Showing 
Significant (t = -4.692, p < .001) Drift Change. 
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intervention. Only two subjects in the same cell who worked 
for points showed a similar pattern. Likewise 6 subjects in 
the NF-NI cell who worked for points showed a significant 
negative drift change while only three similarly treated 
subjects who worked for points showed the same effect. 
The data in Tables 6a and 7a suggests that feedback 
plays an important role, particularly in the effect measured 
by level change. At least two explanations can be suggested 
which might predict the reported results in regard to the 
large proportions of subjects in the Money F-NI cell, explana­
tions free of the need to use motivational constructs. One 
such explanation would be that the new feedback conditions 
in the VR2 condition present an unexpected "novelty" situation 
for the subject, or Hawthorne effect, resulting in a depres­
sion of response rate from which he can recover. A second 
explanation could be in terms of loss of information (Estes, 
1971; Bandura, 1971). In the CRF condition a correct response 
is signalled simultaneously by the buzzer and the presentation 
of a new problem. Once VR2 begins, the buzzer becomes an 
unreliable source of information as to whether a correct 
response has been made. Both these explanations should have 
predicted similar effects in the points condition as in the 
money condition, unless feedback is of different value to the 
subjects in each condition. 
To test for a "novelty" effect or a loss of informa­
tion effect, eight additional subjects were used who worked 
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for neither points or money. The subjects received course 
credit only. Conditions were identical to subjects in F-NI 
conditions with the exception of having the counter dis­
connected. In this case, the buzzer was operative as in 
earlier conditions. The "meaning" of the buzzer was not 
explained to the subjects. 
Results from this group of subjects is given in 
Table 8. The data is similar to that obtained from the F-NI 
group in the points condition. All subjects showed signifi­
cant drift (p < .05). A significant negative level change 
was shown by 2 subjects while 4 of the 8 showed significant 
negative drift change at the point of intervention. A 
"novelty" effect of the magnitude suggested in Table 4a for 
the money subsample does not appear to be supported. 
The possibility of identifying feedback as a predictor 
of level change under certain conditions suggested an inves­
tigation of which variables best predicted group membership 
in the significant level change and significant drift change 
groups. The possibility of a ceiling effect accounting for 
the drift change could also be investigated in this way, be­
ing supported if pre-intervention response rate was the best 
predictor of group membership for the subjects showing sig­
nificant drift change. A discriminant analysis was done to 
investigate these possibilities. 
54 
Table 8. Time Series Analysis to Test for a "Novelty" Effect 
Subject Condition Level Change Drift Drift Change 
1 NF-NI -1.613 6.928* -2.338* 
2 NF-NI -2.907* 6.921* -2.337* 
3 NF-NI -1.673 8.002* -1.744 
4 NF-NI -0.606 2.764* -1.609 
5 NF-NI -1.876 4.940* -3.304* 
6 NF-NI -0.925 4.982* -2.637* 
7 NF-NI -3.408* 4.918* 0.659 
8 NF-NI 0.171 2.606* -1.474 
* 
p < .05. 
Discriminant Analysis 
A discriminant analysis was applied to the time-series 
results in an attempt to determine which variables best pre­
dict membership into groups defined by significant (p < .05) 
level change and significant drift change using the Statisti­
cal Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) (Nie, Hull, Jenkins 
Steinbrenner, and Bent, 1975). The discriminant analysis 
used both independent and dependent variables (response mea­
sures) as classified by the original design as variables which 
might be combined to identify a single dimension along which 
the groups might be best differentiated. 
Six separate discriminant analyses were executed, dif­
ferentiating the level change and drift change groups for the 
subjects who worked for points, those who worked for money, 
and the total sample. The Wilks method of stepwise selection 
was used. In the stepwise selection, a single variable is 
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chosen which maximizes the F ratio and minimizes Wilks' 
lambda, a measure of group discrimination. Each of the other 
variables are paired with the first variable to meet the 
above criterion, and so on until all variables are selected 
or no additional variables provide a minimum level of 
improvement. 
The results of the six discriminant analyses are pro­
vided in Appendix B. In addition to the lists of variables 
in their order of inclusion, values are provided for appro­
priate eigenvalues, canonical correlations, Wilks' lambdas, 
and predicted group membership. Also indicated are those 
variables whose means, in an analysis of variance, were 
found to be significantly (p < .05) different for the two 
groups defined in each analysis. 
The discriminant analysis was used to indicate those 
variables which best predicted membership in the groups de­
fined by level change and drift change. Therefore only the 
first few variables in each analysis were of interest, in 
particular those which also exhibited significantly (p < .05) 
different values for the group defined by the analysis as 
indicated by an analysis of variance. A standard use of the 
discriminant analyses for the subsamples with 32 subjects 
each was not acceptable since the number of variables used 
in the analyses exceeded the number of observations. The 
perfect fit for these analyses is therefore not only not 
surprising but is indeed predictable. 
56 
The discriminant analyses are of value in showing that 
different variables accounted for the effects of level and 
drift change depending on the type of reinforcer used. The 
discriminant analyses and analysis of variance indicate that 
the presence of feedback or not is the single best predictor 
of level change at the point of intervention for the total 
sample. The analyses for the two subsamples show feedback 
again to be indicated as the most potent variable for the 
money subsample but not the points subsample*. The points 
subsample has two variables which are good predictors of 
group membership: VALGAMl, a pre-experimental measure of 
gambling valence, and ABLTYE, an ability measure using the 
error, or effort, units. 
The discriminant analyses for drift change are some­
what more consistent in that need for achievement (NACH) 
appears as a good predictor of group membership in all three 
analyses, while being the best variable for the total sample 
and the points subsample. Instrumentality is indicated as 
a strong variable for the total sample. The ABLTYE measure 
is the best predictor of drift change for the money subsample. 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) 
Table 9 presents the results of a multivariate analy­
sis of variance performed using all 8 measures of performance, 
including the ability measures to check for differences in 
subjects in ability not accounted for in random assignment 
to cells. The main effects of points or money, feedback. 
Table 9. Multivariate Analysis of Variance for the 2x2x2 Factorial Design 
Source Criteria Mean Square F df p less than 
A Multivariate Lambda 1.330 8 ,49 .251 
(Points or AbltyA 62. 016 .860 1 ,56 .358 
Money) AbltyE 588. 062 .282 1 ,56 .597 
ANSCRF 2822. 266 1.033 1 ,56 . 321 
ANSTOT 6123. 063 .793 1 ,56 .377 
ANSVR2 631. 266 .462 1 ,56 .500 
ERRCRF 23370. 766 .385 1 ,56 .537 
ERRTOT 17556. 250 . 083 1 ,56 .775 
ERRVR2 420. 250 .007 1 ,56 .933 
B Multivariate Lambda 1.517 8 ,49 .176 
(Feedback) AbltyA 34. 516 .479 1 ,56 .492 
AbltyE 798. 063 .383 1 ,56 . 538 
ANSCRF 3378. 516 1.201 1 ,56 .278 
ANSTOT 18632. 250 2.412 1 ,56 .126 
AMSVR2 6142. 641 4.491 1 ,56 . 039* 
ERRCRF 12460. 141 .205 1 ,56 .652 
ERRTOT 54522. 250 .257 1 ,56 . 614 
ERRVR2 14823. 063 .253 1 ,56 . 617 
C Multivariate Lambda .379 
CO ,49 .927 
(Instructions) AbltyA 34. 516 .479 1 ,56 .492 
AbltyE 1056. 250 .507 1 ,56 .479 
ANSCRF 2127. 616 .756 1 ,56 .388 
ANSTOT 3937. 563 . 510 1 ,56 .478 
ANSVR2 276. 391 .202 1 ,56 .655 
ERRCRF 72159. 391 1.189 1 ,56 .657 
ERRTOT 304428. 063 1.437 1 ,56 .379 
ERRVR2 80089. 000 1.367 1 ,56 .223 
Table 9 (Continued). Multivariate Analysis of Variance for the 2x2x2 Factorial Design 
Source 
A x B 
A x e 
B x c 
Criteria Mean Square F df p less than 
Multivariate Lambda 1.312 8 ,49 .260 
AbltyA 1. 891 .026 1 ,56 .872 
AbltyE 2997. 563 1.429 1 ,56 .235 
ANSCRF 2364. 391 .840 1 ,56 .363 
ANSTOT 6765. 062 .876 1 ,56 .353 
ANSVR2 1130. 641 .827 1 ,56 .367 
ERRCRF 12127. 516 .200 1 ,56 .657 
ERRTOT 166872. 250 .788 1 ,56 .379 
ERRVR2 89102. 250 1.521 1 ,56 .223 
Multivariate Lambda 1.370 8 ,49 .233 
AbltyA 8. 266 .115 1 ,56 .736 
AbltyE 576. 000 .277 1 ,56 .601 
ANSCRF 2036. 266 .724 1 ,56 .399 
ANSTOT 3540. 250 .458 1 ,56 .501 
ANSVR2 206. 641 .151 1 ,56 . 699 
ERRCRF 235831. 641 3.885 1 ,56 .054 
ERRTOT 337851. 562 1.595 1 ,56 .212 
ERRVR2 9168. 062 .157 1 ,56 ,694 
Multivariate Lambda 1.214 8 ,49 . 311 
AbltyA 6. 891 .096 1 ,56 .758 
AbltyE 1024. 000 .492 1 ,56 .486 
ANSCRF 489. 516 .175 1 ,56 .678 
ANSTOT 2889. 062 .374 1 ,56 .543 
ANSVR2 1000. 141 .731 1 ,56 .396 
ERRCRF 129150. 391 2.128 1 ,56 .150 
ERRTOT 248253. 062 1.172 1 ,56 .284 
ERRVR2 19321. 000 .330 1 ,56 .568 
Table 9 (Concluded). Multivariate Analysis of Variance for the 2 x 2 x 2 Factorial Design 
Source 
A x B x c 
Criteria Mean Square F df p less than 
Multivariate Lambda 657 8,49 .726 
AbltyA 178 .891 2. 480 1,56 .121 
AbltyE 7656 .250 3. 676 1,56 .060 
ANSCRF 5274 .391 1. 875 1,56 .176 
ANSTOT 10609 .000 1. 373 1,56 .246 
ANSVR2 922 . 641 675 1,56 .415 
ERRCRF 86068 .891 1. 418 1,56 .239 
ERRTOT 356110 .563 1. 681 1,56 .200 
ERRVR2 91960. 563 1. 570 1,56 .215 
U1 
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and instructions provide a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design with 8 
dependent variables. Cramer's (1967, 1973) MANOVA program 
was used to perform the analysis on the Cyber 74 computer. 
An alpha level of .05 was chosen for tests of significance. 
Only one test proved to be significant (F^ = 4.4 91, 
p < .05) out of the 48 univariate tests, indicating that 
those subjects who received feedback performed at a lower 
rate during the V R 2 schedule than did those subjects who re­
ceived no feedback, an effect also shown by the time-series 
analysis. This result may be due to the drop in response 
rate at the point of intervention as suggested by the time-
series analysis, an effect which evidently could not be com­
pensated for by a quick recovery. As reported earlier, this 
result does not seem to be due to a "novelty" effect. A 
reanalysis using the ability measures as covariates produced 
no changes for significance at the .05 level. 
Correlational Analysis 
Table 10 gives the correlations between the indepen­
dent variables of the design. Table 11 gives the correla­
tions between the independent variables and each of the six 
dependent variables. Also provided are combinations of 
variables suggested in the expectancy literature and their 
correlations with the dependent variables. 
Due to the large number of correlations presented in 
these two tables, the probability of making a Type I error 
is probably unity. Using conventional methods for testing 
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for significance of correlations at the .05 alpha level, 
probability would suggest the chance of making a Type I 
error 5 times for every 100 correlations tested. As the 
number of correlations becomes substantial, as is the case 
here, one becomes hesitant about rejecting a null hypothe­
sis based on the data alone. Using a Monte Carlo method, 
Harris (1967) and Larzelere (1975) have confirmed that the 
empirical estimate of the probability of making at least 
one Type I error in a family of tests increases substan­
tially as the number of component tests increases. 
To attempt to minimize this problem, the correlation 
indices were tested for significance using the Multistage 
Bonferroni Procedure, described by Larzelere and Mulaik 
(1977). This procedure is a modification of the Bonferroni 
Procedure and satisfies Tukey's criterion of defining the 
familywise error rate as the maximum value it can attain 
under all possible sets of true component null hypotheses 
(Ryan, 1959). 
The first step of the multistep Bonferroni procedure 
requires the specification of the familywise significance 
level, such as .05, which when divided by the number of tests, 
m, determines the nominal significance level (a T) for each 
individual test. Each of the individual tests was evaluated 
at this level of significance. If none of the tests in the 
family of tests is significant, the procedure stops and none 
of the null hypotheses is rejected. However, if k tests 
Table 10. Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables for the Total Sample (N * 6 4 ) 
1. Equity3 1.0 
Effort -04 1.0 
3. Expcty -18 -01 1.0 
4. Insty 14 04 42* 1.0 
5. IVa 26* 19 12 13 
6. IVb -04 11 07 12 31b 1.0 
7. nAch 02 13 -15 11 00 -04 
CO Valmonl 06 14 -15 -14 - 1 4 -10 
9. Valmon2 16 04 -17 -10 -03 -01 
10. Sex -24 -11 -02 -10 03 00 
11. Class -19 06 -24 -11 -02 09 
12. Valgaml 20 16 -06 -09 -11 09 
13. Valgam2 22 04 -21 -15 -19 08 
14. AbltyA 22 19 -13 14 -06 -14 
15. AbltyE 27** 05 -24 11 -08 -18 
16. Age -28* 05 -25b -18 -07 15 
17. GPA 40* -08 -07 05 07 01 
18. Support 10 06 -01 06 -20 -11 
19. PTORMON — 16 17 12 04 -10 
20. Instr -09 05 03 11 -02 -14 
21. Fdback -16 02 -06 35* 11 07 
22. LevChg 05 00 16 18 04 00 
23. DrChg -03 03 08 -26* -03 02 
24. SumlVl 15 09 04 37* -13 10 
25. SumIV2 22 04 00 36* -15 12 
26. Valpts — 17 20 06 14 -07 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.0 
-05 1.0 
13 Sfl.0 
-31b-18 -19 1.0 
-33* 02 -08 24 1 . 0 
01 67° 51C-32* 0 2 1.0 
-07 4^ 42b-ll 0 4 
30** 13 05 -38* 06 2 7 * 2 1 1 . 0 
19 19 14 -27* 04 40* 30* 8 4 ° 1 . 0 
29*-02 01 04 83° 0 0 0 3 0 1 - 0 4 1 . 0 
05 -20 -18 12 17 -12 08 06 05 0 4 
35* 13 11 -20 17 10 07 -01 -08 23 
19 02 -09 00 05 -14 -28* 12 -07 -05 
09 19 07 09 -08 04 08 09 09 -09 
19 -05 05 09 23 -06 06 09 08 10 
-08 -09 -07 24 16 -15 -09 -13 -13 00 
-28*-13 -17 05 -13 -13 04 -15 -18 00 
-12 56° 4^-26 -16 51° 40* 02 08 -09 
-17 49^ 55°-27 -18 43* 40* 00 09 08 
15 05 02 -07 01 -03 -28*-01 -19 -08 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 . 0 
- 1 6 1 . 0 
- 1 3 - 0 6 1 . 0 
0 7 2 3 0 0 1 . 0 
1 1 - 0 3 0 0 0 0 . 1 . 0 
0 9 0 3 0 4 - 1 8 3 3 * 1 . 0 
1 3 - 2 3 - 0 9 - 0 3 - 2 2 0 2 1 . 0 
- 1 1 0 4 0 3 1 3 1 7 - 1 2 - 2 4 1 . 0 
- 1 2 0 4 0 4 1 0 1 3 - 1 3 - 2 7 * 9fl.Q 
- 0 5 - 0 5 7 6 C - 0 8 - 0 4 - 0 4 - 2 0 0 7 0 5 1 . 0 
1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5 2 6 
aScore8 obtained for money subsample only (N » 32). 
*Borderline significance: P T < .05. 
P F W < .01. 
TO 
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Table 11. Correlations of Independent and Dependent 
Variables for the Total Sample 
ANSVR2 ERRVR2 ANSCRF ERRCRF ANSTOT ERRTOT 
Effort 17 13 29 b 19 25 b 17 
Equity (N=32) 5 1 b 33 46 3 8 b 49 b 3 9 b 
Expcty 05 00 -10 -17 -04 -10 
Insty 30 20 17 16 23 19 
I V a 
-02 -03 -06 -12 -04 -08 
I V b 04 02 -06 -03 -02 -01 
nAch 19 07 25 b 10 23 09 
Valmonl 03 06 09 14 07 11 
Valmon2 05 07 03 10 04 09 
Sex -26 -09 - 3 2 b -13 -30 b -12 
Class 08 01 10 13 10 07 
Valgaml 21 11 31 b 2 8 b 2 7 b 21 
Valgam2 22 21 24 20 24 22 
AbltyA 57* 4 0 b 77* 60* 71* 53* 
AbltyE 50* 39 b 70* 66* 63* 56* 
Age 08 04 10 12 09 09 
GPA 15 -01 07 -09 11 -06 
Support -03 -12 -03 -10 -03 -12 
PTORMON 09 -01 13 08 11 04 
Instr 06 15 11 14 09 15 
Fdback 2 7 b 06 14 06 20 06 
LevChg 13 -05 -02 -01 04 -03 
DrChg -12 -02 -14 -08 -14 -06 
SumlVl 14 13 10 15 12 16 
SumIV2 16 16 11 17 14 17 
Valences for class credit (V ) are used. 
2 ^ Valences for money (V ) are used. 
*
 m 
Borderline significance: P < .05 
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Table 11 (Continued). Correlations of Independent and 
Dependent Variables for the Total Sample 
ANSVR2 ERRVR2 ANSCRF ERRCRF ANSTOT ERRTOT 
ValPts 02 -01 -02 -11 00 -12 
E (IV ) 12 09 -05 -03 02 03 
m 
IV +IV, +E+ 
a b 
I+V 16 12 09 10 12 12 
m 
I V b + E ( I V b + 
(IV )) 11 09 -05 -03 02 03 
m 
E(ZIV) 03 06 -07 -03 -03 02 
POINTS 1 
E(IV ) 13 12 -14 13 -02 10 
P 
IV + IV,+E+ 
a b 
I+V 17 -15 -14 -17 -01 -16 
P 
I V b + E ( I V b + 
(IV )) 12 -03 -15 -04 -04 -05 
p 
M O N E Y 2 
E(IV ) 11 07 04 03 07 06 
m 
IV +IV, +E+ 
a D , , , 
I+V 37 17 36 23 37 21 
I V b + E ( I V b + 
(IV ) ) 11 07 04 03 07 05 
m 
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indicate rejection of the null hypotheses, then a second 
stage is begun on the m-k remaining tests. The significance 
level becomes a T = a F W/(m-k) and the remaining null hypothe­
ses not rejected are tested. This process of testing and 
elimination continues until no tests suggest rejection of 
the null hypotheses. Larzelere (197 5) has proven that this 
procedure assures that the probability of making one or more 
Type I errors on any subset of test is no larger than 
The multistage Bonferroni procedure was used to test 
the correlations in Tables 10 and 11 for significance at both 
the .05 and .01 levels of significance. These tables contain 
526 correlations, 24 of which were significant at the .05 
level. Also noted are those correlations in which the null 
hypotheses would have been rejected using conventional pro­
cedures and are noted as borderline. It is also suggested 
that although they do not provide conclusive evidence them­
selves, they may be useful in providing such evidence when 
considered with similar results from other samples (Larzelere 
and Mulaik, 1977). It should also be noted that some of the 
variables are not independent in their components, such as 
INSTY and SUMIVl, SUMIV2 for example, which could produce 
correlations spuriously high. Some of the correlations can 
also be used as indications of test-retest reliability, as 
in the case of SUMIVl with SUMIV2 and VALMON1 with VALMON2, 
with a lag of approximately one hour between tests. 
Few correlations in Table 10 show significance nor 
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provide much in the way of analyses when the test-retest and 
non-independent correlations are ignored. The high correla­
tion between VALPTS, or the value of receiving course credit, 
and PTORMON, the groups receiving points (course credit) or 
money, is not surprising since receiving course credit had 
little meaning as a possible outcome to the subjects working 
for money. The high correlation between ABLTYA and ABLTYE 
may be questioned as being too high in a period of testing 
during the first five minutes when the largest amount of 
"errors" might be expected without a concomitant number of 
answers. Correlations between the valences of money and 
gambling could also be expected due to the phrasing of the 
gambling question in terms of potential monetary gain or loss. 
It is of interest that those who value money most would be 
most willing to gamble on an all-or-nothing basis. 
Table 10 provides some information of more value when 
comparisons are made between independent and dependent 
variables. Responses to the question of equity of payment 
prove to be a good reflection of past performance for those 
individuals who worked for money. Yet these correlations 
would not be predicted by most interpretations of equity 
theory. Instead the correlations should be zero since the 
equity function is U-shaped, predicting poorest performance 
for both those individuals who feel underpaid and overpaid. 
Expectancy theory variables prove to be poor predic­
tors of performance, both individually and in 11 traditional" 
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combinations. Instrumentality is the best correlate with 
performance for the total sample, particularly during the 
VR2 schedule. In terms of expectancy theory, an additive 
model of IVfl + IVfa + E + I + V (Berger et al., 1975) is a 
moderately good predictor of performance (but not effort) 
when applied only to the money subsample with the appro­
priate valence for money is used. The increased correlation 
over the total sample is also partially due to the shrinkage 
in sample size. 
By far the best predictor of performance is measured 
answers and errors during the five minutes of unreinforced 
practice at the beginning of the session (ABLTYA and ABLTYE). 
These measures are conceptualized as ability measures col­
lected before reinforcement is applied. Both indices pre­
dict answer totals but not error, or effort, totals at later 
stages, with the correlations decreasing as the session 
progresses in regard to performance. The ability measures 
correlate poorly with the effort measures during CRF, yet 
become moderately good predictors for effort during the VR2 
schedule. Tables 12 and 13 provide the same correlations 
for the money subsample. The pattern of correlations remain 
stable in most cases. 
Table 14 addresses Vroom's conceptualization of per­
formance being a multiplicative function of motivation and 
ability. Using the expectancy models suggested by the litera­
ture as indices of motivation, comparisons are shown of the 
Table 12. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables for the Money Subsample (N - 32). 
1. Equity 1.0 
2. Effort -04 1.0 
3. Expcty -18 03 1.0 
4. Insty 14 08 54 b 1.0 
5. IVa 26 15 02 10 1.0 
6. IVb -04 39 b 15 01 40 b 1.0 
7. nAch 02 23 -22 08 02 -13 1 . 0 
8. Valmonl 06 26 -13 06 -11 -02 21 1 . 0 
9. Valmon2 16 14 -30 08 -04 04 0 7 ** 
7 4 
1 . 0 
10. Sex -24 -03 17 -05 -01 02 -40 b -45 b - 2 9 1 . 0 
11. 
12. 
Class 
Valgaml 
-19 
21 
12 
30 
-28 
12 
-25 
20 
-13 
05 
06 
25 
30 
20 
00 
** 
63 
02 
37 b 
1 5 
- 5 4 B 
1 . 0 
05 1 . 0 
13. Valgam2 22 40 b 02 20 05 23 27 31 27 - 4 2 B 10 ** 
6 9 
1 . 0 
14. AbltyA 22 25 -08 34 26 -16 38 b 43 b 22 -44 b 10 43 b 3 3 1 . 0 
15. AbltyE 27 09 -21 28 17 -34 33 39 b 28 -38 b 03 
** 
8 9 
4 3 B 3 3 ** 
8 7 
1 . 0 
16. Age -28 07 -30 -34 -13 13 33 02 07 06 -02 -01 -02 - 1 4 1 . 0 
17. GPA 40 b -10 -04 07 05 -02 -08 -10 -04 -05 18 -06 19 -01 03 1 4 1 . 0 
18. Support -10 18 10 23 -29 00 38 b 30 18 -22 20 24 23 -06 -13 2 3 -10 1 . 0 
19. Instr -09 00 21 21 00 . -19 27 16 -03 -09 -19 -10 - 1 1 13 02 - 1 1 06 38 b 1 . 0 
20. FdBack -16 -11 07 50 b 04 -06 20 00 23 09 23 02 09 1 1 21 17 06 08 0 0 1 . 0 
21. LevChg 05 03 06 31 -12 19 -25 11 14 25 16 17 0 4 01 10 04 10 09 -29 43 b 1 . 0 
22. DrChg -03 -06 05 -23 03 15 -20 -18 -17 36 b -06 -31 -16 -32 -41 b 03 34 -31 06 -19 -04 1 . 0 
23. 
24. 
SumlVl 
SumIV2 
15 
22 
08 
03 
31 
14 
54 b 
47 b 
-08 
-13 
11 
10 
12 
07 
35 b 
24 
33 
43 b 
-53 b 
-55 b 
-29 
-25 
51 b 
42 b 
4 2 B 
4 9 B 
17 
09 
09 -14 
08 -12 
05 
1 2 
36 b 
30 
16 
06 
19 14 
23 09 
-30 
-32 
1 . 0 
** 
92 1 . 0 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2 2 23 24 
** 
P f w < .01 
bBorderline significance: P T < .05. 
00 
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Table 13. Correlations of Independent and Dependent 
Variables for the Money Subsample 
ANSVR2 ERRVR2 ANSCRF ERRCRF ANSTOT ERRTOT 
Effort 24 17 33 21 30 20 
Equity 5 1 b 34 46 3 8 b 4 9 b 39 b 
Expcty -01 06 -09 -09 -06 -01 
Insty 27 10 19 16 23 14 
IV 
a 
11 02 16 00 14 01 
l v b -10 -17 -16 -24 -14 -22 
nAch 22 09 3 5 b 18 31 14 
Valmonl 35 b 18 4 1 b 30 4 0 b 25 
Valmon2 27 17 24 24 26 22 
Sex -26 -06 -39 b -11 -35 b -09 
Class 15 -02 18 -15 18 06 
Valgaml 39 b 09 4 9 b 31 46 21 
Valgam2 4 2 b 23 44 19 44 23 
AbltyA 63** 4 8 b 81*** 69*** 75*** 62** 
AbltyE 60* 3 9 b 75*** 69*** 70*** 5 7 b 
Age 09 -01 09 08 09 04 
GPA 3 6 b 12 17 01 25 06 
Support 10 -07 07 -03 09 -05 
Instr 01 09 00 -11 00 -01 
Fdback 15 -08 02 00 08 -04 
LevChg 31 -05 10 19 18 07 
DrChg -10 06 -27 -17 -20 -05 
SumlVl 23 04 17 00 20 02 
SumIV2 20 03 13 -02 16 00 
P F W < - 0 5 -
b
 PFW < - 0 1 -
Borderline Significance: P T < .05. 
Table 14. Performance = Motivation x Ability? 
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IF Motl 
Mot2 
Mot3 
Mot4 
= E(IV 
m 
= IV + IV, + E + I + V 
a b m 
= IV, + E(IV + (IV) ) 
D a m 
= E(Z IV) 
D.V. with I.V. 
ANSVR2 AbltyA 
Motl*AbltyA 
Mot2*AbltyA 
Mot3*AbltyA 
Mot4*AbltyA 
Equity*AbltyA 
ANSCRF AbltyA 
Motl*AbltyA 
Mot2*AbltyA 
Mot3*AbltyA 
Mot4*AbltyA 
Equity*AbltyA 
ANSTOT AbltyA 
Motl*AbltyA 
Mot2*AbltyA 
Mot3*AbltyA 
Mot4*AbltyA 
Equity*AbltyA 
ERRVR2 AbltyE 
Motl*AbltyE 
Mot2*AbltyE 
Mot3*AbltyE 
Mot4*AbltyE 
Equity*AbltyA 
ERRCRF AbltyE 
Motl*AbltyE 
Mot2*AbltyE 
Mot3*AbltyE 
Mot4*AbltyE 
ERRTOT AbltyE 
Motl*AbltyE 
Mot2*AbltyE 
Mot3*AbltyE 
Mot4*AbltyE 
(.6321) 
(.7529) 
5714 
3992 
5611 
4014 
1321 
7208 
7740 (.8087) 
3230 
7171 
3258 
0721 
8441 
7081 
3636 
6695 
3661 
0994 
8108 
3878 
2769 
3970 
2780 
1286 
5573 
6588 
2438 
6077 
2444 
0630 
5603 
2764 
5371 
2773 
1010 
(.3892) 
(.6867) 
(.5695) 
"Vm = Valence for money, 
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multiplicative functions as predictors of performance as 
compared to the ability measures alone. Only in one case 
did the multiplication improve prediction, very modestly at 
that (from .39 to .40 ERRVR2). Where equity was inserted 
for a measure of motivation, prediction of performance can 
be improved, in this case most noticeably for measures during 
the VR2 schedule which is actually more removed in time from 
the time of ability measurement than ANSCRF and ERRCRF. 
Correlations in parentheses are the ability measures for the 
money subsample only correlated with the "dependent" vari­
ables, being slightly larger due to the smaller sample size. 
This is important since equity can only be calculated for 
the money subsample (N = 32). 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Adequacy of the Questionnaire Measures 
The reliability coefficients for the questionnaire 
data appear to be in an acceptable range, .55 to .93, when 
instrumentality and subjective estimates of the probability 
of reinforcement are not included. The reliability estimate 
of .55 for expectancy is comparable or better than reliabili­
ties reported for this variable in other studies (Lawler, 1968; 
Schwab and Dyer, 1974; Sheridan et al., 1973). Expectancy is 
also a value which might be expected to fluctuate as one be­
comes more familiar and proficient at the task. The median 
reliability coefficient obtained for valence measures (.91) 
is substantially larger than those reliabilities reported 
earlier (Schwab and Dyer, 1973; Sheridan et al., 1973). 
The reliability coefficients for instrumentality (.04) 
and subjective estimates of reinforcement frequency (-.57) 
certainly do not seem acceptable in the standard use of such 
measures. In this case, both these variables depend on the 
experimental manipulation itself. There was no way to guar­
antee that the objective probability of reinforcement remained 
constant over sessions due to the use of a probability genera­
tor, and the negative correlation could reflect actual change 
in probability, or more likely, changes in perceptions as 
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experience increases. Instrumentality is the variable which 
the design was aimed at modifying, and whose estimates were 
hopefully under a state of flux as the probability of rein­
forcement changed. The results reported for the entire study 
also suggest that the values reported for these two variables 
may indeed have been random. The test-retest measures were 
obtained from a sample of subjects which did not work for money 
but under conditions like that used for the point subsample in 
the F-NI condition. If these subjects reacted similarly to 
the larger sample, it may be that the feedback information, 
which should have been used to form the judgments of instru­
mentality and probability of reinforcement, actually had only 
secondary value as a source of information. Fluctuations in 
expectancy and instrumentality both can be tolerated, and per­
haps even expected, although such fluctuations can provide 
problems for the researcher who uses a longitudinal design. 
An Interpretation of the Research Results 
The conclusion that the point subsample did not react 
to the manipulations, specifically the feedback, is founded 
on the reports of instrumentality, amount of reward earned, 
and estimates of the probability of reinforcement. The feed­
back significantly reduced the instrumentality reports for 
the money subsample, an effect largely due to the very low 
instrumentality reports for the F-I group. No differences 
were found for instrumentality in any of the conditions in 
which nonredeemable points were the "reward." It appears 
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that feedback is the more potent of the two types of infor­
mation concerning reinforcement schedule as it relates to 
the present design. Instrumentality perceptions for the 
money subsample would support the role of feedback and in­
structions in reducing instrumentality perceptions except 
the case where those subjects receiving no feedback of any 
kind reported a lower mean instrumentality than those sub­
jects who received instructions only. The subjects receiving 
no information would be predicted to report high instrumen­
talities. The lowered instrumentalities may be due to the 
fact that all subjects received reports or verification of 
how many points or cents they had earned before filling out 
the questionnaire. Thus the NF-NI subjects did receive feed­
back in a lumped-together form which most likely altered 
their perceptions based on what they thought they had earned 
or thought they should have earned. Of course, it should 
also be noted that the mean instrumentality for the NF-NI is 
not significantly different from the NF-I or F-NI groups in 
the money subsample, and therefore discussing such trends 
in the data may be unnecessary or unwarranted. 
The instrumentality data by itself can present a case 
for concluding that the subjects who worked for nonredeemable 
points either ignored the information as manipulated in the 
experimental design or at best placed little value in it. 
The case becomes stronger when larger discrepencies are 
noted for the points subsample between the number of points 
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reported as earned and the number actually earned as well as 
between estimates of reinforcement probability and actual 
reinforcement frequency as compared to the money subsample. 
It would be possible to attempt to attribute signifi­
cant intervention effects such as a depression of response 
rate to a motivation decrement which the expectancy model 
would predict in its present interpretation. The data analysis 
suggests a more parsimonious interpretation which attributes 
the response decrement to a loss of information. 
Very little support for expectancy theory was generated 
by either inspection of the response curves or the correla­
tional analysis. Only one subject (223) exhibited a response 
curve which was originally conceptualized as being strong 
evidence for a decrement in motivation as predicted by the 
expectancy model (Mahinney and Behling, 197 3). While a 
total of 20 subjects (31%) showed a response decrement at the 
point of changeover from continuous reinforcement to a vari­
able ratio schedule, 17 of these subjects were able to recover 
to a point where their response totals were close to or better 
than performance under continuous reinforcement. 
Correlations between expectancy models and response 
measures are similarly of little support. The complete model 
predicts performance more poorly than any other independent 
variable or combination tested for the total sample. It should 
be noted that only one instrumentality value was obtained, 
while in a strict interpretation of a within-subjects design 
76 
such as this, an instrumentality perception should be obtained 
for each possible outcome. The list of possible outcomes 
was also generated by the experimenter, with some outcomes 
perhaps being unrealistic or meaningless. Yet when the appro­
priate valences for the actual outcomes (receiving money of 
class credit) and the appropriate instrumentality measure are 
combined in a multiplicative model for each subsample, the 
correlations are only marginally improved (median r = .11). 
No positive correlation between expectancy composite 
models and response measures exceed .16 except for an addi­
tive model suggested by Berger et al. (1975), applied to the 
money subsample, which accounts for approximately 14% of the 
variance for all three performance measures. Error rates, 
or effort, are not accounted for as well, although the model 
is designed to predict effort (Vroom, 1964). The correlations 
between the Berger model and the response measures can be 
attributed largely to the valence component, which is the 
best predictor of performance of all the expectancy components 
and models. The additive model has little logical appeal 
since any component could go to zero without having the equa­
tion go to zero, which should be predicted. This additive 
model does include measures of intrinsic values for the task, 
which should be considered, although they contribute little 
in the present study. It is of interest to note no difference 
(t = -.34, p > .05) in intrinsic value perceptions for the 
two subsamples. A greater difference might have been 
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predicted by some researchers (Deci, 1971, 1972a, 1972b). 
One observation on the composite expectancy model is 
that the expectancy and instrumentality measures reported 
here are not independent (r = .42), with independence being 
a requirement for the multiplicative model. A definite 
possibility, at least in this case, is that the correlation 
represents a high degree of method variance. Expectancy and 
instrumentality perceptions were obtained as probabilities, 
with those questions being the only two of that kind on the 
questionnaire. The distinction between effort-performance 
and performance-outcome probabilities may also have been 
difficult. While this study, along with many others, suggest 
a limited usefulness for the composite model, the problems 
in the measurement of its components should be investigated 
before the model is discarded or modified. The findings that 
the manipulation of schedules did affect instrumentality per­
ceptions for some subjects suggests that this variable may 
function in a manner which we may not yet understand. 
Another measurement consideration in the use of moti­
vation models such as those examined here concerns the dimen­
sionality of each of the components. For example, an additive 
model should require that each of the component variables 
represent the same dimension of measurement. In a multipli­
cative model, the variables which form the multiplicand and 
multiplier might be measured in different dimensions, but 
this difference should be reflected in the dimensions of 
measurement applied to the product. The measurement of 
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motivational variables as attempted here needs to be refined 
and investigated to a point where it can be determined if 
such refinement is possible, and if so, what dimensions are 
appropriate. Such rigor is of central importance in the 
physical sciences, and this rigor may be applicable to the 
behavioral sciences. 
The central role that feedback plays as a determinant 
of performance was indicated by the time-series analysis, the 
discriminant analysis, and the analysis of variance. The ana­
lysis of variance simply showed that individuals who received 
feedback in the form of a counter and buzzer showed a slower 
response rate (answers) during the variable ratio schedule 
than those subjects who received no such feedback. The time-
series analysis and discriminant analysis showed that this 
effect was due largely to an abrupt change in the level of 
the response curve at the point of intervention. This effect 
was most pronounced for those subjects who worked for money 
and received feedback but no instructions. 
While there might be a small motivational basis for 
such an effect, as suggested by expectancy models, the data 
did not support such an interpretation. Even though instruc­
tions which inform the subject that the probability of rein­
forcement has been reduced should reduce instrumentality 
perceptions, only five out of 32 (15%) subjects who received 
instructions showed the level change. In addition, out of 
the group of subjects which reported the lowest 
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instrumentalities, i.e., F-I money, only one out of eight 
showed the significant level change. While the data suggest 
that the "F-I money" subjects were the only subjects who 
reacted to the manipulation by reporting reduced instrumen­
talities, a corresponding decrement in responding as pre­
dicted by the expectancy model was not found for these 
subjects. 
While the discriminant analysis showed feedback to be 
the variable which best determined level change, for the 
entire sample, the effect was largely confined to the money 
subsample. Level change for the points subsample was best 
predicted by a pre-experimental measure of gambling valence 
and a response measure. The role of valence for gambling 
has been suggested by other researchers (Yukl and Latham, 
1975) as being of some importance in these types of studies. 
Feedback and instructions were provided to indicate to 
the subjects the presence of rewards as determined by the 
design. If the money and points did indeed serve as reinfor­
cers, the feedback should have acted as a signal and reinfor­
cer itself. As a potential reinforcer, the feedback also 
provided a source of information (Estes, 1971; Bandura, 1971). 
One possible function of this information could have been to 
signal the successful completion of a problem while simul­
taneously indicating the presentation of a new problem. When 
the reinforcement schedule was changed from continuous rein­
forcement to a variable ratio schedule, such information 
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would become unreliable and should lead to a decrement in 
performance until the subject finds a suitable replacement 
for this information. Such an effect was indicated by the 
data for the subjects who received money as the reinforcer 
while not in the points subsample. This leads to the con­
clusion that the information provided by the feedback was 
of more importance to the subjects who worked for money, 
perhaps because it acted as a reinforcer while the points 
had little if any reinforcing value. The feedback was prob­
ably of extraneous value to the subjects who worked for non-
redeemable points. Such a conclusion is supported by less 
accurate reports of point totals and frequencies as well as 
the data showing no effect on reported perceptions of 
instrumentality. 
As reported earlier, level changes exhibited for the 
points subsample were indicated best by the valence for gamb­
ling in the discriminant analysis. The problems involved 
with studies in which variable ratio schedules mimick gambling 
situations and thus influence moral judgments from the subjects 
are discussed by Yukl and Latham (1975). These types of per­
ceptions might help explain the level changes if the subjects 
with low gambling valences were those subjects who demonstra­
ted the level change effect. Yet an opposite result was found. 
It was the subjects with high gambling valences who exhibited 
the effect. This result, could be interpreted by simply extrap­
olating from the previous discussion of the informative role 
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of the feedback which was differentially attended to by the 
two subsamples. It may be possible that the feedback was 
of little or no consequence to the subjects receiving non-
redeemable points until the VR2 schedule was imposed, at 
which time the subjects who found this feedback to be attrac­
tive in a gambling sense redirected their attention toward 
the feedback, which would in turn cause a decrement in 
performance. The feedback again is an unreliable indicator 
of successful completion of a problem under the VR2 schedule 
while under CRF it could augment the information provided by 
the machine itself. 
One additional note concerning expectancy theory is 
its application specifically as a predictor of effort, not 
performance. Some researchers have used a very simple task 
as a criterion in an attempt to remove ability as a modera­
tor of effort and performance (Graen, 1969; Jorgenson, 
Dunnette, and Pritchard, 1973; Arvey, 1972; Motowidlo et al., 
1972; Dachler and Mobley, 1973). In the present study, an 
attempt was made to differentiate between effort and perform­
ance measures. The Complex Coordinator reports an "error" 
each time the lights are matched for a limb of the body. 
Therefore a minimum of four errors is required before one 
"answer" is recorded, with no limit on how many errors can 
be made before the answer is given. Making errors requires 
little skill and was defined as a measure of effort. This 
measure of effort did not correlate as well with expectancy 
82 
variables and combinations as did the performance measure, 
or answers. The effort counts did not correlate well with 
self-reports of effort (median r = .17). Although one may 
argue with the conceptualization and measurement of effort, 
the results reported here do not support its usefulness as 
a motivational measure. 
By far the best predictors of performance were the 
ability measures, defined as total answers and errors during 
five minutes of unreinforced responding at the beginning of 
the experiment. In operant terminology, the best predictor 
of performance was past performance. A close rival for pre­
dictive value were measures of equity, or perceived fairness 
of pay, for those subjects who received money as the 
reinforcer. Equity, as presented by Adams (1963, 1965) is 
a motivational variable based on cognitive dissonance and 
social comparison processes. Although equity was not actively 
manipulated here, its correlation with performance measures 
is interesting but should not be strictly predictable. 
According to the Adams conceptualization, subjects who are 
underpaid under an incentive system should produce more quan­
tity and lower quality as a means of reducing inequity while 
those individuals who are overpaid should produce fewer items 
of higher quality. While no measure of quality was possible 
here, the theory would suggest a curvilinear, or inverted 
U-shaped relationship between equity feelings and performance 
instead of the linear relationships indicated by the high 
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correlations. The most probable explanation for the rela­
tively high positive correlations is that the threshold for 
underpayment is lower than for overpayment (Levanthal, Weiss, 
and Long, 1969) and that the overpaid subjects found it 
acceptable to receive overpayment for such a short period 
of time. 
Since the data suggest equity as a possible determi­
nant of motivation, the possibility of using the equity and 
ability measures in Vroom's equation. Performance = Motiva­
tion x Ability, became of interest. As Table 13 indicates, 
substituting equity perceptions for motivation and ability 
as measured in answers for the ability variable, correlations 
with four performance measures (ANSCRF, ANSVR2, ANSTOT, and 
ERRVR2) were substantially improved over correlations using 
either the ability or equity measures alone. 
The drift change data was analyzed using a discrimi­
nant analysis (Appendix B) to indicate what variables ac­
counted for responding being maintained or decelerating after 
intervention. The finding that drift change occurred 
frequently 11 spontaneously" as in the NF-NI condition where 
no intervention was used makes this result very difficult to 
interpret in a meaningful way. Need for achievement is an 
important variable for both subsamples, while a ceiling 
effect for the money subsample may also be indicated by the 
response measure (ABLTYE) which is the best predictor of 
drift change. The role of nACH in all research using human 
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subjects needs further investigation. 
Implications for Future Research 
Future attempts to improve on the research reported 
here should be based on an awareness of the limitations and 
implications of this study in terms of both internal and 
external validity. Where time and resources would permit, 
it might be desirable to extend the number and lengths of 
observations. This would allow the subjects to reach a less 
variable level of responding before intervention is attempted 
to allow for easier interpretation of the results. Some 
design modifications might also be implemented to aid in the 
explanation of results, such as a return to continuous rein­
forcement after the variable ratio sessions. Using a group 
of subjects who received an opposite order of treatments, 
i.e., administering VR2 first and then CRF, while also in­
creasing the size of the ratios might also give insight in­
to the role of schedules of reinforcement and the issues in 
question. 
If the practical problems of expense, time, and sub­
ject participation can be set aside, such longitudinal study 
can still present some substantive problems relating directly 
to expectancy theory. Both the reliability data reported in 
this study and common sense indicated the fluctuations in 
perceptions of instrumentality and, to some extent, expectancy. 
Constant monitoring of instrumentality would be bothersome, 
of questionable value in terms of independence of measurements 
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and could easily influence the results of the experiment by 
influencing the subjects' perceptions of the experimental 
situation. In addition, the number of measurements becomes 
impractical if instrumentalities are to be generated for all 
possible outcomes, as is suggested for a true within-subject 
design. It is also conceivable that the list of possible 
outcomes might change as time has its effect on the percep­
tion of the work environment. 
While the present study is not flawless in design, us­
ing a single, relatively brief experimental session in a con­
trolled setting seems to be optimal for investigation expec­
tancy theories. The naive subject can be expected to remain 
unaware of the purpose of the study when inquiries as to his/ 
her perceptions are limited to a single report. The number 
of realistic outcomes are limited, are made known to the 
subject "a priori," and are easily measured for valence. 
There are no social factors which can obviously influence the 
subject, such as group norms and co-worker influences. 
Generalizations to a real work environment were natu­
rally limited as controls were added to the situation. In 
some ways generalizations to a work environment were knowingly 
sacrificed. For obvious reasons, it is unlikely that a manip­
ulation of pay schedules such as those used here could ever 
be attempted in a field study. In addition, no base pay was 
given to those subjects who worked for money, a situation al­
so rarely found in the field. Yet not giving base pay seems 
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to be a requirement for studies in motivation such as the one 
reported here. 
The task used in this study appears to have some appli­
cability to some work settings which require eye-hand-foot 
coordination. A "work" situation was created by making pay 
dependent on performance. Yet it would take a vivid imagi­
nation to say that a single one hour session constitutes a 
realistic work setting. One possible implication for the work 
setting could spring from the actual decremental effect the 
feedback had, particularly under the VR2 schedule. Providing 
immediate feedback of a similar nature as described here under 
an intermittent schedule might detract from attention to the 
task at hand, resulting in less than optimum performance. 
In order to attempt to answer the questions which 
formed the basis for this study, the emphasis becomes more 
on experimentation than on generalization. It is suggested 
here that, if a model such as the expectancy model cannot be 
supported in a controlled situation in which many relevant 
perceptions can be accounted for, the possibility of finding 
support for the model are limited by method, measurement, 
and past research. 
While the emphasis of this thesis is in the area of 
industrial-organizational psychology, implications of the 
results as applied to past and future experimentation using 
human subjects should be considered. Appropriately the 
question is one of motivation. Participation in psychological 
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studies is usually rewarded by class credit, pay dependent 
on performance, performance-independent pay, or a combination 
of these. It is safe to say that these things are of dif­
ferent value from individual to individual. It is almost 
equally safe to say that these "valences" are seldom measured. 
The assumption is that the individual would not participate 
if the reward was not of some value to him/her. Yet the in­
terpretation of the results of this study suggests that, 
while few group differences were indicated by the analysis 
of variance, the groups differed greatly in regard to both 
their reactions to the experimental manipulations and to 
the variables which determined their performance. These dif­
ferences can be at least partially attributed to the rein­
forcers offered and their effect on the perception of the 
experimental environment. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
An experiment was reported in which 64 students per­
formed a complex coordination task under continuous rein­
forcement and intermittent (variable ratio) reinforcement 
successively with the primary goal of determining whether 
decrements in performance under intermittent reinforcement 
predicted by expectancy theory were actually found. Manipu­
lated variables included type of reinforcer (money or non-
redeemable points), performance feedback, and instruction 
concerning schedule of reinforcement, providing a 2x2x2 
factorial design. Performance criteria included number of 
problems correctly "answered" and errors, with errors being 
conceptualized as an effort measure. Questionnaires solici­
ted responses to perceptions of experimental manipulations, 
expectancy variables, and demographic data. Analyses were 
selected with special reference to detecting and explaining 
changes in performance at the point of intervention (chang­
ing from continuous to intermittent reinforcement) as well 
as attempting to account for response variance. An inter­
pretation of the results has led to the following conclusions 
1. A response decrement at the point of intervention was 
attributed to a loss of information rather than having 
a motivational basis as predicted by expectancy theory. 
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The effect was largely transitory in nature in that 
subjects would typically recover from the reduction in 
response rate. 
2. Information provided for the subjects according to the 
design (i.e., feedback and instructions) was of less 
importance to the subjects who worked for nonredeemable 
points as compared to those who worked for money. There­
fore the experimental manipulations should be examined 
for their effects in regard only to the money subsample 
when generalizing to other settings. 
3. Different variables were most effective in predicting 
level change and drift change at the point of interven­
tion depending on the type of reinforcer used. 
4. Expectancy variables and composite equations did not 
satisfactorily account for response variance regardless 
of whether performance or effort measures were used as 
the criterion. 
5. Self-reports of effort as a criterion are not satisfactory. 
They do not correlate well with objective measures of 
effort. High correlations with expectancy variables may 
be attributable largely to method variance. 
6. The best single predictor of performance was an ability 
measure defined as five minutes of unreinforced respond­
ing at the beginning of the experiment. The predictive 
power of this measure was increased by multiplying it by 
perceptions of equity of payment for the money subsample. 
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7. Feedback indicating reinforcement was a potent variable 
causing reduced performance under intermittent rein­
forcement for subjects who worked for money most often 
when the feedback was not paired with instructions con­
cerning reinforcement schedule. This effect was not due 
to a novelty or Hawthorne effect. 
8. The present state of the measurement of expectancy vari­
ables needs considerable study in terms of identifying 
what the concepts are measuring as well as defining the 
dimensionalities of the components and composite equations. 
9. Under the conditions specified here, expectancy theory 
does not show promise as a motivational model. Equity 
perceptions appear to hold more promise as a motivational 
construct. 
10. All experiments using human subjects should evaluate the 
effects of various reinforcers on their results. Indivi­
dual differences in valences for such rewards can affect 
the interpretation and generalizability of a study. 
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APPENDIX A 
PRE- AND POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRES 
You will be working on a task for approximately the next 
hour which requires concentration but is not especially demand­
ing of physical exertion. Below are some possible outcomes 
following completion of the hour. Rate them as to how you would 
value each one from -6 to +6 as followsi 
-6 -5 -4 -3 --2 -1.0 + 1 + 2 +3 +4 +5 +6" 
Extremely Very Bad Neutral Good Very Extremely 
Bad Bad Good Good 
Write the number of your choice in the space before each-outcome. 
Remember to include the plus (+) nr»d minus (-) signalt 
60 minutes of experimental credit (course credit) 
one dollar 
— an "A" in your easiest course 
_ %5% (1 in 4) chance to win twelve dollars (or nothing) 
three dollars 
. nothing 
50% chance (1 in 2) to win six dollars (or notMng) 
fifty cents 
get your name in the Technique saying you did well 
set your name in the Technique saying you did poorly 
m five dollars 
a personal "thank you" from your instructor 
an "A" in your hardest course 
This questionaire section consists of a number of pairs 
of statements about things that you may or may not like. Here 
is an example» 
A I like to talk about myself to others. 
B I like to worV toward some goal that I have set 
for myself. 
Which of these two statements is more characteristic of 
what you like? You may like both A and B. In this case, you 
would have to choose between the two and you should choose the 
one you like better. If you dislike both A and B, then you 
should choose the one that you dislike less. 
The following pairs of statements are similar to the uuove 
example, Head each pair of statements and pick out the one 
staement that better describes what you like. For each numbered 
item draw a circle around A or B to indicate the statement you 
have chosen. 
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1. A I would like to accomplish something of great.significance, 
B I like to find out what great men have thought about 
various problems in which I am Interested, 
2. A I would like to be a recognized authority in some Job, 
profession, or field of specialization. 
B Any written work that I do I like to have precise, neat, 
and well organized. 
3. A I would like to write a great novel or play. 
B I like to tell amusing stories and jokes at parties. 
4. A I like to be able to come and go as I want to, 
B I like to be able to say that I have done a difficult 
job well, 
5. A I like to solve puzzles and problems that other people 
have difficulty with, 
B I like to follow instructions and do. what is expected 
of me, 
6. A I like to attack points of view that are contrary to mine. 
B I like ipy friends to confide in me and to tell me their 
troubles. 
7. A I like to have my work organized and planned before 
beginning it, 
B I would lVze to be a recognized authority in some Job, 
profession, or field of specialization, 
8. A I like to tell amusing stories and jokes at parties, 
B I like to be able to do things better than other people 
can, 
9. A I like to be able to ccme and go as I want to. 
B I like to accomplish tasks that others recognize as 
requiring skill and effort. 
10, A I like to avoid being interrupted while at my work. 
B I like to criticize people who are in a position of 
authority. 
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11, A I like to form new friendships. 
B I like to be successful in things undertaken. 
12, A I like to solbe puzzles and problems that other pedple 
have difficulty with, 
B I like to Judge people by why they do something - not 
by what they actually do, 
13, A I like my friends to encourage me when I meet failure, 
B I like to accomplish tasks that others recognize as 
requiring skill and effort, 
14, A When serving on a committee, I like to be appointed or 
elected chairman, 
B I would like to write a great novel or play, 
15, A I feel quilty whenever I have done something I know 
is wrong. 
B I would like to be a recognized authority in some Job, 
profession, or field of specialization. 
16, A I like to help other people who are .less fortunate 
than I am. 
B I like to do my very best in whatever I undertake, 
17, A I like to eat in new and strange restaurants. 
B I like to be able to do things better than other 
people can, 
13, A I like to work hard et any Job I undertake, 
B I like to be able to say that I have done a difficult 
Job well, 
19, A I like to kiss attractive persons of the opposite sex, 
B I would like to accomplish something of great significance, 
20, A I like to attack points of view ths;t are contrary to 
mine. 
B I would like to write a great novel or play. 
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21. A I like to do my very best at whatever I undertake. 
B I like to be loyal to my friends. 
22. A I like to be able to say that I have done a difficult 
Job well, 
B I like to observe how another individual feels in a 
given situation. 
23. A I like my friends to encourage me when I meet with 
failure. 
B I like to be successful in things undertaken, 
Zk, A I like to be one of the leaders in the organizations 
and groups to which I belong, 
B I like to be able to do things better than other people 
can, 
25. A I like to solve puzzles and problems that other people 
have difficulty with, 
B When things go wrong for me, I feel that I am more to 
blame than anyone else, 
26, A I like to help my friends when they are in trouble. 
B I like to do my very best in whatever I undertake. 
2?. A I like to accomplish tasks that others recognize as 
requiring skill and effort, 
B X like to travel and see the country, 
20, A I would like to accomplish.something of groat significance, 
B I like to work hard at any job I undertake, 
29. A I like to be successful in things undertaken. 
B I like to go out with attractive persons of the opposite 
sex, 
30. A I like to read newspaper accounts of murders and other 
forms of violence, 
B I would like to write a great novel or play. 
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Below are some possible outoomes for the task which you 
have Just completed. Rate them as to how you would value each 
one from -6 to +6 as followsi 
* S6 ~ 5 -h "3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Extremely Very Bad Neutral Good Very Extremely 
B a d b a d
 Good Good 
Write the number of your choice in the space before the outcome. 
figmeabor to include the plus (+) and, minus (-) olgnslI 
* 
five dollars 
a personal "thank you" from your instructor 
get your name in the Technique saying you did poorly 
set your name in the Technique saying you did well 
fifty cents 
50% chance (1 in 2) to win six dollars (or nothing) 
nothing 
three dollars 
25% chance (1 in k) to win twelve dollars (or nothing) 
an "A" in your hardest course 
one dollar 
60 minutes of experimental credit (course credit) 
an "A" in your easiest class 
Subject No. Amt. Received 
Please answer the following questions as best you can. 
1. Considering the amount of effort and time spent, the pay I 
received wasi (Circle one number) 
1 2 3 ^ 5 6 ? 
Not fair Fair Much 
at all too much 
2. The amount of effort I expended overall was: (Circle one) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
As little Medium As much as 
as I could I could 
3. During the last two 10-minute sessions, how often did you 
receive a penny for every 10 correct answers (on the average)? 
About pennies for every 10 correct answers. 
4, What did you feel the chances were that if you increased 
your effort it would lead to better performance (more matches)? 
(Think of it as a probability from 0 to 10), 
out of 10 
5. What did you feel the chances were that an increase in 
performance would lead to earning more money? 
out of 10 
6. Of what value do you feel learning to do this task was to 
you? (Circle one) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No So-ne Great 
Value V.-lue Value 
7, Of what value was doing well on the task regardless of the 
pay? (Circle one) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No Some Great 
Value Value Value 
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8, Did you use the information about your performance (on the 
counter) to set goals for yourself for improvement as you 
went along? (Circle one) 
Yes No 
If Yes, please explain what you did and how often. 
9. Did you believe that the experimenter was really going to 
pay you? 
1 2 3 ^ 5 6 7 
No Had some Yes 
doubts 
The following questionsare to be answered voluntarily. Your 
assistance would be greatly appreciated. The answers will be 
in no way connected to your name. They are solely for research 
purposes. If you don't know an answer, place a question mark 
(?) in that space. Thank you. 
Sox J Male Female (Circle one) 
Age: 
Year in school: Frosh Soph Jr Sr Graduate 
Married? Yes No 
Ma j o r s 
Grade point average (approx.): 
Are .you on some form of scholastic aid? Yes No 
Approximately what percentage of your schooling do you pay for? 
% 
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APPENDIX B 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS PRINTOUTS 
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T 
- -- -- D I S C R I M I N A N T D r i f t C h a n g e 
S U B F I L E M O N E Y P O I N T S ( T o t a l s a m p l e ) 
G R O U P C O U N T S 
G R O U P 1 G R O U P 2 T O T A L 
N U M B E R 2 9 . 3 5 . 6 4 . 
A L L E L I G I B L E V A R I A B L E S I N C L U D E D 
S U M M A R Y T A B L E 
V A R I A B L E F J I L K S L A M B D A S I G . V C H A N G E S I G . 
NACII 5 . 1 7 3 4 2 . 9 2 2 9 8 . 0 2 6 5 . 1 7 3 4 2 . 0 2 3 
S U M I V 2 7 . 9 4 2 1 5 . 8 1 6 4 2 . 0 0 2 8 . 7 6 7 9 5 . 0 0 3 
V A L G A M 2 2 . 0 4 0 1 7 . 7 8 9 5 7 . 0 0 3 2 . 5 8 2 2 2 . 1 0 8 
S E X 2 . 0 5 8 2 7 . 7 6 2 9 6 . 0 0 3 2 . 7 3 9 3 7 . 0 9 8 
A B L T Y E 2 . 7 0 8 7 1 . 7 2 8 9 1 . 0 0 2 3 . 7 9 5 1 3 . 0 5 1 
S U P P O R T 2 . 4 5 3 0 0 . 6 9 8 8 4 . 0 0 2 3 . 6 6 0 4 8 . 0 5 6 
I N S T R 1 . 1 2 3 4 6 . 6 8 5 0 9 . 0 0 2 1 . 7 7 9 8 5 . 1 8 2 
A G E 1 . 1 7 2 2 6 . 6 7 0 8 0 . 0 0 3 1 . 9 2 8 8 8 . 1 6 5 
C L A S S 2 . 0 2 5 1 9 . 6 3 7 4 5 . 0 0 2 4 . 8 3 5 6 4 . 0 2 8 
E R R C R F 1 . 3 1 9 0 8 . 6 2 1 9 7 . 0 0 3 2 . 4 2 0 7 2 . 1 2 0 
I V A 1 . 2 7 6 3 0 . 6 0 7 0 7 . 0 0 3 2 . 4 4 6 6 5 . 1 1 8 
E F F O R T 1 . 0 0 2 9 2 . 5 9 5 3 6 . 0 0 4 2 . 0 0 8 4 1 . 1 5 6 
A N S C R F 1 . 1 0 1 3 1 . 5 8 2 5 3 . 0 0 5 2 . 2 9 3 7 8 . 1 3 0 
l'NSTY 1 . 0 3 5 3 0 . 5 7 0 4 8 . 0 0 6 2 . 2 4 8 7 7 . 1 3 4 
L E V C H G . 4 3 8 9 2 . 5 6 5 3 1 . 0 0 9 . 9 9 3 7 9 . 3 1 9 
G P A . 5 6 2 1 8 . 5 5 8 6 2 . 0 1 3 1 . 3 1 1 8 4 . 2 5 2 
E X P C T Y . 3 8 5 1 7 . 5 5 3 9 9 . 0 1 9 . 9 2 9 3 3 . 3 3 5 
- A B L T Y E . 0 0 0 6 2 . 5 5 3 9 9 . 0 1 1 - - . 0 0 1 5 1 1 . 0 0 0 
V A L G A M 1 . 5 1 9 2 4 . 5 4 7 8 1 . 0 1 6 1 . 2 6 3 2 8 . 2 6 1 
S U M I V l . 6 3 8 2 9 . 5 4 0 1 5 . 0 2 1 
1.60534 
. 2 0 5 
- I N S T Y . 0 0 1 0 6 . 5 4 0 1 6 . 0 1 3 - . 0 0 2 6 9 1 . 0 0 0 
A N S T O T . 1 8 7 2 6 . 5 3 7 9 2 . 0 1 9 . 4 7 7 6 3 . 4 8 9 
E R R T O T . 3 0 0 6 8 . 5 3 4 2 7 . 0 2 8 . 7 8 7 6 4 . 3 7 5 
V I L M 0 N 2 . 0 5 2 5 0 . 5 3 3 6 2 . 0 4 2 . 1 4 1 6 9 . 7 0 7 
V A L . M O N 1 . 1 6 5 8 6 . 5 3 1 5 2 .,058 .4 5 8 8 4 . 4 9 3 
A B L T Y E . 0 7 4 5 5 . 5 3 0 5 6 . 0 8 2 . 2 1 2 1 1 . 6 4 5 
A B L T Y A . 0 5 6 0 5 . 5 2 9 8 1 . 1 1 2 . 1 6 3 7 4 . 6 8 6 
- A N S C R F . 0 0 0 1 5 . 5 2 9 8 2 . 0 8 1 - . 0 0 0 4 4 1 . 0 0 0 
N U M B E R E I G E N V A L U E C A N . C O R R . P T R A C E W I L K S 
0 . 8 8 7 4 5 . 6 8 5 7 0 1 0 0 . 0 .5 2 9 8 2 
1 F U N C T I O N S W I L L B E U S E D I N R E M A I N I N G A N A L Y S E S 
S T A N D A R D I Z E D D I S C R I M I N A N T F U N C T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S 
1 
E F F O R T - . 4 0 1 7 5 
E X P C T Y - . 2 7 7 9 9 
I V A . 3 3 5 1 1 
NA.PW ,^47A-X. 
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VALMON1 - . 2 8 5 5 3 
VAI..M0N2 . 2 9 3 8 9 
SEX . 5 6 7 5 7 
C L A S S . 0 2 7 3 8 
VALGAMJ. . 4 2 9 9 5 
VALGAM2 - . 6 2 9 5 4 
ABLTYA . 1 4 8 7 7 
A B L T Y E - . 1 9 5 8 7 
AGE - 1 . 1 4 1 6 0 
CPA - . 1 9 4 4 6 
SUPPORT . 6 4 9 0 2 
I N S T R - . 3 1 7 2 0 
LEVCHG - . 2 3 6 9 4 
S U M I V I - . 3 0 9 4 3 
S U M 1 ^ 2 1 . 1 0 7 1 8 
ANSTOT . 6 9 1 0 3 
E R R C R F . 3 3 2 0 3 
ERRTOT - . 8 6 9 9 9 
C E N T R O I D S OF GROUPS I N 
GROUP 1 1 . 0 1 8 6 2 
GROUP 2 - . 8 4 4 0 0 
P R E D I C T 1 0 N R E S U L T S 
ACTUAL GROUP 
NAME CODE 
N OF P R E D I C T E D GROUP M E M B E R S H I P 
C A S E S GROUP 1 GROUP 2 
GROUP 1 29 2 3 . 
7 9 . 3 P 
6 . 
2 0 . 7 P 
GROUP 2 v> . 
14 . 3 P 
3 0 . 
8 5 . 7 P 
8 2 . 8 P E R C E N T OF KNOWN CASES CORRECTLY C L A S S I F I E D 
C H I - S Q U A R E = 2 7 . 5 6 3 S I G N I F I C A N C E = . 0 0 0 
A U T O - M O D E - RETURNED- FROM S P S S . 
2 0 0 . 0 0 5 EACH 
? E X E C U T E 
E N T E R I N G S P S S . 
T 
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- D I S C R I M I N A N T - - -
S U B F I L E M O N E Y 
G R O U P C O U N T S 
G R O U P 1 G R O U P 2 T O T A L 
N U M B E R 1 3 . 1 9 . 3 2 . 
A L L E L I G I B L E V A R I A B L E S I N C L U D E D 
S U M M A R Y T A B L E 
V A R I A B L E F W I L K & L A M B D A S I G . V C H A N G E S I G . 
A B L T Y E 6 . 1 5 0 6 3 . 8 2 9 6 8 . 0 1 9 6 . 1 5 8 6 3 . 0 1 3 
S U P P O R T 5 . 4 7 7 3 6 . 6 9 7 8 7 . 0 0 5 6 . 8 2 9 4 4 . 0 0 9 
G P A . 4 0 5 7 6 . 6 4 0 9 6 . 0 0 5 3 . 3 1 6 3 6 . 0 5 1 
S U M I V 2 1 . 0 4 9 7 9 . 5 9 9 8 7 . 0 0 6 3 . 2 0 6 6 1 . 0 7 3 
A N S T O T 1 . 7 2 0 2 0 . 5 6 2 6 4 . 0 0 8 3 . 3 0 3 9 6 . 0 6 9 
A N S C R F **> . 5 3 9 2 9 . 5 1 0 7 6 . 0 0 6 5 . 4 1 5 8 0 . 0 2 0 
I N S T R 1 . 4 5 6 7 2 . 4 3 1 5 3 . 0 0 3 3 . 5 6 5 0 7 . 0 5 9 
V A L G A M 2 1 . 9 6 7 9 7 . 4 4 3 5 3 . 0 0 7 5 . 3 3 0 7 1 . 0 2 1 
V A L M O N l . 9 4 2 4 0 . 4 2 5 3 6 . 0 1 1 2 . 8 9 7 0 9 . 0 8 9 
N A C H . 8 2 0 7 6 . 4 0 9 3 6 . 0 1 6 2 . 7 5 6 5 2 . 0 9 7 
F D B A C K 1 . 1 1 0 4 4 . 3 8 7 8 3 . 0 2 0 4 . 0 6 8 9 3 . 0 4 4 
A B L T Y A . 5 6 7 6 1 . 3 7 6 5 3 . 0 2 9 2 . 3 1 0 9 1 . 1 2 8 
I V B . 3 1 1 6 5 . 3 7 0 1 7 . 0 4 7 1 . 3 7 9 3 1 . 2 4 0 
E R R C R F . 2 1 2 8 5 . 3 6 5 5 9 . 0 7 3 1 . 0 1 4 7 3 . 3 1 4 
A G E . 3 0 7 8 9 . 3 5 8 6 9 . 1 0 6 1 . 5 7 9 0 5 . 2 0 9 
I N S T Y . 5 6 4 8 2 . 3 4 5 6 7 . 1 3 7 3 . 1 4 9 3 5 . 0 7 6 
C L A S S . 5 1 0 7 4 . 3 3 3 5 1 . 1 7 6 3 . 1 6 6 1 0 . 0 7 5 
G P A . 0 0 0 0 3 . 3 3 3 5 1 . 1 1 6 - . 0 0 0 1 8 1 . 0 0 0 
E X P C T Y . 6 8 0 2 9 . 3 1 8 0 5 . 1 4 4 4 . 3 7 1.04 . 0 3 7 
V A L G A M 1 . 6 6 7 0 1 . 3 0 2 5 3 . 1 7 7 4 . 8 3 9 6 4 . 0 2 8 
N A C H . 0 0 3 5 6 . 3 0 2 6 1 . 1 1 6 - - . 0 2 7 1 4 1 . 0 0 0 
I V A . 3 1 5 1 0 . 2 9 5 4 5 . 1 6 1 2 . 4 0 2 9 6 . 1 2 1 
V A L M O N l . 0 0 0 0 2 . 2 9 5 4 5 . 1 0 4 - . 0 0 0 1 8 1 . 0 0 0 
E R R T O T . 2 5 7 4 0 . 2 8 9 7 1 . 1 4 9 2 . 0 1 0 5 2 . 1 5 6 
V A L M 0 N 2 . 2 9 6 3 5 . 2 8 2 7 3 . 2 0 3 2 . 5 5 7 2 2 . 1 1 0 
V A L M O N l . 5 5 0 7 5 . 2 6 9 2 5 . 2 5 0 5 . 3 1 2 6 3 . 0 2 1 
S U M I V I . 5 4 6 0 5 . 2 5 5 3 1 . 3 0 2 6 . 0 8 4 1 4 . 0 1 4 
S E X . 3 7 5 6 6 . 2 4 5 0 8 . 3 7 4 4 . 9 0 4 6 4 . 0 2 7 
N A C H . 2 7 5 7 1 . 2 3 6 9 2 . 4 6 2 4 . 2 1 8 7 1 . 0 4 0 
N U M B E R E I G E N V A L U E C A N . C O R R . P T R A C E W I L K S S I G . 
0 3 . 2 2 0 9 2 . 8 7 3 5 5 1 0 0 . 0 . 2 3 6 9 2 . 2 1 3 
1 F U N C T I O N S W I L L B E U S E D I N R E M A I N I N G A N A L Y S E S 
S T A N D A R D I Z E D D I S C R I M I N A N T F U N C T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S 
1 
E X P C T Y 1 . 0 7 4 7 9 
I N S T Y - 2 . 2 7 4 6 1 
I V A 1 . 0 4 3 4 0 
I V B . 5 7 7 1 9 
w a r n .AA.KOi 
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V A L M O N 1 2 . 0 0 2 1 6 
V A L M 0 N 2 - 2 . 1 6 4 2 5 
S E X . 0 6 5 5 ? 
C L A S S 2 . 2 3 0 2 4 
V A L G A M 1 - . 4 3 2 6 ? 
V A L G A M 2 - 2 . 1 2 1 1 4 
A B L T Y A - . 1 4 9 8 1 
A B L T Y E 1 . 9 2 8 0 5 
A G E - 2 . 8 1 6 3 6 
S U P P O R T 2 . 1 7 4 4 9 
I N S T R - 1 . 2 6 5 4 7 
E D B A C K . 8 5 9 6 3 
S U M I V l - 2 . 9 4 2 1 9 
S U M I V 2 6 . 0 9 9 4 0 
A N S C R F " 5 . 1 7 9 6 2 
A N S T O T - 5 . 7 6 8 5 5 
E R R C R F ' - 5 . 2 0 0 6 9 
E R R T O T 4 . 8 4 3 0 4 
C E N T R O I D S O F G R O U P S I N 
G R O U P 1 2 . 1 0 0 7 8 
G R O U P 2 - 1 . 4 3 7 3 8 
P R E D I C T I O N R E S U L T S 
A C T U A L G R O U P 
N A M E C O D E 
N O F P R E D I C T E D G R O U P M E M B E R S H I P 
C A S E S G R O U P 1 G R O U P 2 
G R O U P 1 
G R O U P 
1 3 
1 9 
1 3 . 
1 0 0 . O P 
O P 
O P 
1 9 . 
1 0 0 . O P 
1 0 0 . 0 P E R C E N T O F K N O W N C A S E S C O R R E C T L Y C L A S S I F I E D 
C H I - S Q U A R E = 3 2 . 0 0 0 S I G N I F I C A N C E = . 0 0 0 
S U B F I L E P O I N T S 
G R O U P C O U N T S 
G R O U P 1 G R O U P 2 U N G R O U P D 
N U M B E R 1 6 . 1 6 . 3 2 . 
A L L E L I G I B L E V A R I A B L E S I N C L U D E D 
S U M M A R Y T A B L E 
V A R I A B L E F W I L K S L A M B D A S I G . V C H A N G E S I G . 
N A C H 3 . 8 8 2 2 2 . 8 8 5 4 2 . 0 5 8 3 . 8 8 2 2 2 . 0 4 9 
S U M I V 2 7 . 5 6 3 6 8 . 7 0 2 3 0 . 0 0 4 8 . 8 3 4 7 0 . 0 0 3 
S E X 8 . 4 0 3 5 7 . 5 4 0 1 8 . 0 0 1 1 2 . 8 2 0 5 2 . 0 0 0 
V A L G A M 2 3 . 5 2 1 0 5 . 4 7 7 8 4 . 0 0 0 7 . 2 4 2 5 9 . 0 0 7 
V A L M 0 N 2 3 . 3 5 2 4 3 . 4 2 3 2 8 . 0 0 0 8 . 0 9 5 3 2 . 0 0 4 
V A L M O N l 8 . 4 0 7 9 8 . 3 1 6 7 5 . 0 0 0 2 3 . 8 3 6 7 4 . 0 0 0 
API T Y A 1 .f;q/,/i7 . 2 9 7 1 1 . o n o A * 9Aft'~,R . 01 9 
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A B L T Y E 6 . 1 0 2 1 6 . 2 3 4 8 1 . 0 0 0 2 6 . 7 8 9 2 1 . 0 0 0 
V A L G A M 1 3 . 5 5 4 2 3 . 2 0 2 1 5 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 6 4 0 6 7 . 0 0 0 
L E V C H G 1 . 4 0 0 9 7 . 1 8 9 4 4 . 0 0 0 9 . 9 5 6 8 8 . 0 0 2 
G P A 1 . 5 4 6 7 5 . 1 7 5 0 4 . 0 0 0 1 2 . 2 4 7 1 2 . 0 0 0 
G U M I V I 2 . 2 0 7 2 5 . 1 5 6 9 5 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 5 3 7 8 6 . 0 0 0 
I N S T R 1 . 9 4 2 7 7 . 1 4 1 6 6 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 6 3 0 5 3 . 0 0 0 
F D B A C K 2 . 7 1 5 3 3 . 1 2 2 1 5 . 0 0 0 3 3 . 8 2 5 7 8 . 0 0 0 
E X P C T Y 1 . 1 4 7 3 2 . 1 1 3 9 8 . 0 0 0 1 7 . 6 1 1 3 4 . 0 0 0 
I V B 1 . 1 3 5 5 1 . 1 0 5 9 6 . 0 0 0 1 9 . 9 2 5 3 6 . 0 0 0 
I V A 1 . 3 9 0 7 5 . 0 9 6 3 3 . 0 0 0 2 8 . 2 8 8 5 6 . 0 0 0 
A G E 1 . 7 0 9 3 3 . 0 8 5 1 4 . 0 0 0 4 0 . 9 4 8 4 5 . 0 0 0 
A N S C R F 1 . 3 2 1 7 0 . 0 7 6 6 9 . 0 0 0 3 8 . 8 1 1 1 4 . 0 0 0 
E R R T O T . 6 5 0 5 0 . 0 7 2 4 1 . 0 0 1 2 3 . 1 . 3 3 2 6 . 0 0 0 
E R R C R F 3 . 0 3 4 9 5 . 0 5 5 5 5 . 0 0 1 .1.25. 7 4 3 8 4 0 
A N S T O T 2 . 5 6 5 9 4 . 0 4 3 2 3 . 0 0 1 1 5 3 . 9 7 4 1 0 0 
C L A S S . 6 3 5 7 1 . 0 4 0 0 4 . 0 0 2 5 5 . 1 5 0 7 0 . 0 0 0 
I N S T Y . 2 0 4 1 0 . 0 3 8 4 8 . 0 0 6 3 0 . 4 1 4 7 0 . 0 0 0 
E F F O R T . 4 2 6 7 6 . 0 3 5 9 3 . 0 1 4 5 5 . 4 5 0 3 0 . 0 0 0 
A G E . 0 0 0 4 3 . 0 3 5 9 3 . 0 0 5 - . 0 6 0 4 7 1 . 0 0 0 
S U P P O R T . 1 7 6 8 4 . 0 3 4 9 0 . 0 1 3 2 4 . 6 1 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 
A G E . 0 8 3 4 4 . 0 3 4 3 3 . 0 3 4 1 4 . 3 4 4 2 3 . 0 0 0 
N U M B E R E I G E N V A L U E C A N . C O R R . P T R A C E W I L K S S I G . 
0 2 8 . 1 3 1 5 4 . 9 8 2 6 9 1 0 0 . 0 . 0 3 4 3 3 . 0 0 0 
1 F U N C T I O N S W I L L B E U S E D I N R E M A I N I N G A N A L Y S E S 
S T A N D A R D I Z E D D I S C R I M I N A N T F U N C T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S 
1 
E F F O R T - . 6 6 1 0 2 
E X P C T Y 1 . 9 6 6 9 2 
I N S T Y - 1 . 4 8 7 4 4 
I V A 1 . 2 9 8 2 0 
I V B - 1 . 3 2 2 5 9 
N A C H 5 . 7 8 3 2 4 
V A L M O N l - 8 . 8 0 5 3 0 
V A L M 0 N 2 5 . 9 3 6 4 2 
S E X 6 . 8 8 0 1 7 
C L A S S - 1 . 0 0 2 5 2 
V A L G A M 1 . 9 8 3 2 6 
V A L G A M 2 - 1 . 7 2 5 0 0 
A B L T Y A 8 . 4 3 4 8 2 
A B L T Y E - 7 . 1 2 1 4 0 
A G E . 5 1 0 4 6 
G P A - 2 . 1 9 4 6 1 
S U P P O R T - . 4 5 5 3 7 
I N S T R 1 . 1 7 9 9 3 
F D B A C K - . 2 9 6 0 0 
L E V C H G - 2 . 3 6 3 1 5 
S U M I V I 5 . 7 0 7 1 2 
S U M I V 2 1 . 6 4 9 3 8 
A N S C R F 1 1 . 8 0 8 0 4 
A N S T O T - 1 3 . 9 5 3 4 5 
E R R C R F - 1 2 . 5 0 3 6 4 
E R R T O T 1 3 . 6 0 9 4 8 
C E N T R O I D S O F G R O U P S I N 
G R O U P 1 5 . 1 3 5 5 0 
G R O U P 2 - 5 . 1 3 5 5 0 
P R F r i T L T T O N RF<;ill T S 
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ACTUAL GROUP N OF P R E D I C T E D GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
NAME CODE C A S E S GROUP 1 GROUP 2 
GROUP 1 1 16 1 6 . 0 
1 0 0 . OP OP 
GROUP 2 2 16 0 1 6 . 
OP 1 0 0 . O P 
1 0 0 , 0 P E R C E N T OF KNOWN CASES CORRECTLY C L A S S I F I E D 
C H I - S Q U A R E = 3 2 . 0 0 0 S I G N I F I C A N C E = . 0 0 0 
A U T O - M O D E - RETURNED FROM S P S S . 
2 0 0 . 0 0 5 A L L 
? 2 1 0 . 0 0 5 G R 0 U P S = L E V C H G < 1 » 2 > / 
E X E C U T E 
E N T E R I N G S P S S . 
T 
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- - - D I S C R I M I N A N T - Level Change 
S U B F I L E M O N E Y P O I N T S (total Sample) 
G R O U P C O U N T S 
G R O U P 1 G R O U P 2 T O T A L 
NUMBER- 1 5 . 4 9 . 6 4 . 
A L L E L I G I B L E V A R I A B L E S I N C L U D E D 
S U M M A R Y T A B L E 
V A R I A B L E F W I L K S L A M B D A S I G . V C H A N G E S I G . 
F D BACK- 7 . 6 7 0 9 0 . 8 8 9 8 0 . 0 0 7 7 . 6 7 8 9 0 . 0 0 6 
S E X 3 . 1 9 0 6 3 . 8 4 5 5 7 . 0 0 6 3 . 6 4 4 5 9 . 0 5 6 
I N S T R 3 . 0 8 5 2 6 . 8 0 4 2 1 . 0 0 4 3 . 7 7 0 3 6 . 0 5 2 
E X P C T Y 2 . 6 8 6 5 1 . 7 6 9 1 9 . 0 0 3 3 . 5 1 0 3 9 . 0 6 1 
S U P P O R T 1 . 5 5 5 7 0 . 7 4 9 1 0 . 0 0 4 2 . 1 6 2 0 0 . 1 4 1 
A N S T O T . 8 3 4 6 8 . 7 3 8 2 9 . 0 0 7 1 . 2 1 1 9 9 . 2 7 1 
A N S C R F 1 . 5 6 8 4 1 . 7 1 8 1 7 . 0 0 7 2 . 3 5 2 0 1 . 1 2 5 
G P A 1 . 2 9 8 7 7 . 7 0 1 6 0 . 0 0 9 2 . 0 3 8 6 1 . 1 5 3 
s u m i v 2 1 . 3 9 1 3 7 . 6 8 3 9 8 . 0 1 0 2 . 2 7 6 9 3 . 1 3 1 
N A C H 1 . 3 4 8 5 3 . 6 6 7 0 1 . 0 1 1 2 . 3 0 6 3 9 . 1 2 9 
I N S T Y . 4 0 9 7 3 . 6 6 1 8 0 . 0 1 6 . 7 3 2 4 1 . 3 9 2 
V A L M O N 1 . 8 8 4 3 2 . 6 5 0 5 2 . 0 2 1 1 . 6 2 4 4 6 . 2 0 2 
V A L M 0 N 2 . 5 8 6 3 3 . 6 4 2 9 8 . 0 2 3 1 . 1 1 7 6 6 . 2 9 0 
- E X P C T Y . 0 0 0 0 0 . 6 4 2 9 8 . 0 1 7 - . 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 
S U M I V l 1 . 4 3 9 1 3 . 6 2 4 9 9 . 0 1 7 2 . 7 7 5 5 1 . 0 9 6 
D R C H G . 3 3 9 1 1 . 6 2 0 6 9 . 0 2 6 . 6 3 6 5 3 . 4 0 7 
I V B . 2 1 0 9 4 . 6 1 7 9 7 . 0 3 8 . 4 3 8 9 7 . 5 0 8 
C L A S S . 1 9 5 8 5 . 6 1 5 4 1 . 0 5 4 . 4 1 8 0 6 . 5 1 8 
A G E 1 . 3 3 4 1 6 . 5 9 8 0 6 . 0 5 5 2 . 9 2 1 9 9 . 0 8 7 
A B L T Y A . 2 2 7 9 9 . 5 9 5 0 5 . 0 7 5 . 5 2 5 2 3 . 4 6 9 
V A L G A M 1 . 0 4 6 9 8 . 5 9 4 4 2 . 1 0 5 . 1 1 1 2 4 . 7 3 9 
E F F O R T . 0 3 4 7 0 . 5 9 3 9 4 . 1 4 3 . 0 8 4 1 8 . 7 7 2 
E R R T O T . 0 4 2 4 6 . 5 9 3 3 4 . 1 8 9 . 1 0 5 5 2 . 7 4 5 
E R R C R F 1 . 3 9 1 0 8 . 5 7 3 8 7 . 1 3 1 3 . 5 4 5 3 5 . 0 6 0 
- S U M I V 2 . 0 0 0 4 0 . 5 7 3 8 7 . 1 3 6 - . 0 0 1 0 4 1 . 0 0 0 
V A L G A M 2 . 0 8 7 6 2 . 5 7 2 6 5 . 1 7 7 . 2 3 0 9 0 . 6 3 1 
S U M I V 2 . 0 1 0 7 4 . 5 7 2 4 9 . 2 2 9 . 0 2 9 0 8 . 8 6 5 
N U M B E R E I G E N V A L U E C A N . C O R R . P T R A C E W I L K S 
0 . 7 4 6 7 5 . 6 5 3 8 4 1 0 0 . 0 . 5 7 2 4 9 
1 F U N C T I O N S W I L L B E U S E D I N R E M A I N I N G A N A L Y S E S 
S T A N D A R D I Z E D D I S C R I M I N A N T F U N C T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S 
1 
E F F O R T 
I N S T Y 
I V B 
N A C H 
V A L M 0 N 1 
V A L M 0 N 2 
- . 0 9 2 0 9 
. 3 5 4 8 5 
- . 0 6 0 6 9 
- . 3 4 6 2 0 
. 6 5 4 0 2 
- . 2 8 2 7 2 
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C L A S S . 6 9 6 1 3 
VALGAM1 - . 2 9 1 3 4 
VALGAM2 . 1 2 4 1 7 
ABLTYA - . 4 5 5 2 2 
AGE - . 6 5 1 0 2 
GPA - . 4 1 9 4 5 
SUPPORT . 2 4 1 3 5 
I N S T R - . 3 3 4 8 4 
FDBACK . 3 8 2 2 2 
DRCHG . 2 5 3 1 8 
S U M I V I - . 4 1 0 1 3 
SLIMIV2 - . 1 1 0 3 0 
ANSCRF - 2 . 5 4 4 1 7 
ANSTOT 3 . 4 9 9 6 2 
E R R C R F 2 . 2 1 9 0 4 
ERRTOT - 2 . 4 5 9 1 8 
C E N T R O I D S OF GROUPS I N 
GROUP 1 - 1 . 5 3 7 2 5 
GROUP 2 . 4 7 0 5 9 
P R E D I C T I O N R ESULTS -
ACTUAL GROUP 
NAME CODE 
N OF P R E D I C T E D GROUP M E M B E R S H I P 
CASES GROUP 1 GROUP 2 
GROUP 1 1 4 . 
9 3 . 3 P 
1 . 
6 . 7 P 
GROUP 2 49 9 . 
18 . 4 P 
4 0 . 
8 1 . 6 P 
8 4 . 4 P E R C E N T OF KNOWN CASES CORRECTLY C L A S S I F I E D 
C H I - S Q U A R E = 3 0 . 2 5 0 S I G N I F I C A N C E -• . 0 0 0 
A U T O - M O D E - RETURNED FROM S P S S . 
2 0 0 . 0 0 5 EACH 
? E X E C U T E 
ENTERTNG S P S S . 
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T 
D I S C R I M I N A N T - - -
S U B F I L E MONEY 
GROUP COUNTS 
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 TOTAL 
NUMBER 8 . 2 4 . 3 2 . 
ALL E L I G I B L E V A R I A B L E S I N C L U D E D 
SUMMARY T A B L E 
V A R I A B L E F W I L K S LAMBDA S I G . V CHANGE S I G . 
FDBACK 6 . 9 2 3 0 8 . 8 1 2 5 0 , 0 1 3 6 . 9 2 3 0 3 . 0 0 9 
NACH 5 . 0 6 1 3 0 . 6 9 1 7 7 . 0 0 5 6 . 4 4 4 1 0 . 0 1 1 
GPA 4 . 7 1 2 0 6 . 5 9 2 1 2 . 0 0 2 7 . 2 9 8 1 7 . 0 0 7 
ANSTOT 3 . 6 0 9 6 4 . 5 2 2 2 9 . 0 0 1 6 . 7 7 3 4 7 . 0 0 9 
A N S C R F 8 . 6 2 2 9 0 . 3 9 2 2 2 . 0 0 0 1 9 . 0 4 9 5 9 . 0 0 0 
VALGAM1 2 . 8 7 4 5 0 . 3 5 1 7 7 . 0 0 0 8 . 7 9 4 6 4 . 0 0 3 
S U M I V 2 2 . 5 4 0 1 4 . 3 1 8 1 0 . 0 0 0 9 . 0 2 6 2 9 . 0 0 3 
EXPCTY 1 . 6 1 4 5 2 . 2 9 7 2 4 . 0 0 0 6 . 6 2 0 1 9 , 0 1 0 
VALM0N2 2 . 8 6 7 5 3 . 2 6 2 9 6 . 0 0 0 1 3 . 1 5 5 3 9 , 0 0 0 
VALMON1 3 . 8 2 3 3 4 . 2 2 2 4 2 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 7 9 7 8 9 . 0 0 0 
I N S T Y 1 . 7 3 9 9 3 . 2 0 4 6 1 . 0 0 0 1 1 . 7 3 4 3 6 . 0 0 1 
C L A S S 1 . 2 8 9 3 1 . 1 9 1 6 1 . 0 0 0 9 . 9 4 9 2 1 . 0 0 2 
I N S T R . 6 3 4 2 9 . 1 8 4 5 9 . 0 0 0 5 . 9 5 2 0 2 . 0 1 5 
SEX • 6 1 5 5 5 . 1 7 8 1 4 . 0 0 1 5 . 8 8 4 5 6 . 0 1 5 
A B L T Y E . 5 7 1 2 5 . 1 7 2 0 0 . 0 0 1 6 . 0 1 2 5 6 . 0 1 4 
I V B 1 . 1 5 6 1 2 . 1 5 9 6 9 . 0 0 2 1 3 . 4 4 3 0 3 . 0 0 0 
E R R C R F . 8 3 4 8 2 . 1 5 0 7 1 . 0 0 3 1 1 . 2 0 2 0 0 . 0 0 1 
ERRTOT 2 . 6 7 3 2 1 . 1 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 2 4 0 . 9 3 3 0 8 . 0 0 0 
-VALGAM.1. . 0 0 0 4 9 . 1 2 5 0 1 . 0 0 1 - . 0 0 9 1 0 1 . 0 0 0 
I V A 3 . 9 9 1 1 6 . 0 9 5 6 4 . 0 0 1 7 3 . 6 7 8 1 6 . 0 0 0 
S U M I V l 2 . 2 8 0 0 3 , 0 8 0 3 7 . 0 0 1 5 9 . 5 9 6 8 1 . 0 0 0 
•CLASS . 0 0 0 9 2 . 0 8 0 3 8 . 0 0 0 - . 0 2 8 5 7 1 . 0 0 0 
E F F O R T . 6 7 0 2 2 . 0 7 6 1 3 . 0 0 0 2 0 . 8 4 5 7 1 . 0 0 0 
VALGAM1 . 1 4 1 7 9 . 0 7 5 1 6 . 0 0 1 5 . 0 7 9 5 6 . 0 2 4 
VALGAM2 . 3 9 0 3 5 . 0 7 2 3 3 . 0 0 3 1 5 . 5 8 0 9 8 . 0 0 0 
ABLTYA . 1 7 5 3 6 . 0 7 0 9 5 . 0 0 7 8 . 0 8 0 8 8 . 0 0 4 
SUPPORT . 9 2 2 1 8 . 0 6 3 6 2 . 0 1 1 4 8 . 7 3 9 3 3 • 0 0 0 
AGE . 2 7 8 2 5 . 0 6 1 1 9 . 0 2 4 1 8 . 7 4 4 1 3 . 0 0 0 
JUMPER E I G E N V A L U E C A N . C O R R . P TRACE W I L K S 
0 1 5 . 3 4 3 3 8 . 9 6 8 9 2 1 0 0 . 0 . 0 6 1 1 9 
1 F U N C T I O N S W I L L BE USED I N R E M A I N I N G A N A L Y S E S 
S T A N D A R D I Z E D D I S C R I M I N A N T F U N C T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S 
1 
E F F O R T 
E X P C T Y 
I N S T Y 
I V A 
T U P 
1 . 5 0 3 5 4 
1 . 9 5 7 1 2 
- 2 . 3 5 9 6 2 
2 . 0 2 3 5 5 
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NACH 2 . 3 5 1 0 1 
V A L M O N l - . 9 2 6 2 9 
VALM0N2 . 3 6 0 0 6 
SEX . 1 0 6 2 1 
VALGAM1 1 . 9 0 6 4 7 
VALGAM2 - 2 . 2 8 0 7 7 
ABLTYA 3 . 3 5 6 7 2 
A B L T Y E - 1 . 4 0 8 0 5 
AGE - . 5 4 4 4 2 
GPA 2 . 3 9 3 3 8 
S U P P O R T 1 . 4 5 6 1 5 
I N S T R - . 9 1 5 2 0 
FDBACK 
- . 6 1 8 1 0 
S U M I V 1 - 5 . 1 5 5 8 2 
S U M I V 2 6 . 2 5 9 3 2 
A N S C R F 4 . 3 4 0 1 8 
ANSTOT - 9 . 0 3 7 4 0 
E R R C R F - 1 1 . 8 6 6 4 8 
E R R T O T 1 2 . 2 0 1 1 6 
C E N T R O I D S OF GROUPS I N REDUCED SPACE 
GROUP 1 6 . 5 6 9 1 1 
GROUP 2 - 2 . 1 8 9 7 0 
P R E D I C T I O N R E S U L T S -
ACTUAL GROUP 
NAME CODE 
N OF 
CASES 
P R E D I C T E D GROUP MEMBERSHI 
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 
GROUP 1 
GROUP 2 
8 . 
1 0 0 . O P OP 
0 2 4 . 
OP 1 0 0 . O P 
1 0 0 . 0 P E R C E N T OF KNOWN CASES CORRECTLY C L A S S I F I E D 
C H I - S Q U A R E " 3 2 . 0 0 0 S I G N I F I C A N C E = . 0 0 0 
S U B F I L E P O I N T S 
GROUP COUNTS 
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 
NUMBER 7 . 2 5 . 
ALL E L I G I B L E V A R I A B L E S I N C L U D E D 
UNGROUPD 
3 2 . 
SUMMARY TABLE 
V A R I A B L E F W I L K S LAMBDA S I G . V CHANGE S I G . 
VALGAM1 9 . 9 2 6 4 2 . 7 5 1 3 8 . 0 0 4 9 . 9 2 6 4 2 . 0 0 2 
A B L T Y E 3 . 0 8 8 8 4 . 6 7 9 0 5 . 0 0 4 4 . 2 5 2 6 3 . 0 3 9 
VALGAM2 2 . 6 8 0 0 6 . 6 1 9 7 4 . 0 0 3 4 . 2 2 8 6 6 . 0 4 0 
I V B 2 . 6 5 8 5 5 . 5 6 4 1 8 . 0 0 3 4 . 7 6 6 4 6 . 0 2 9 
C L A S S 2 . 6 6 7 8 9 . 5 1 1 6 8 . 0 0 3 5 . 4 5 6 2 6 . 0 2 0 
F X P C T Y 2 . 6 3 5 0 7 . 4 4 2 8 9 . 0 0 2 4 . 1 7 9 R 2 . 0 1 3 
Ill 
ERRTOT 1 . 7 5 9 8 5 . 4 3 1 2 7 . 0 0 2 4 . 7 5 2 3 5 . 0 2 9 
I N S T Y 3 . 1 5 1 0 8 . 3 7 9 3 0 . 0 0 2 9 . 5 3 0 3 0 . 0 0 2 
SUPPORT 1 . 2 8 9 6 6 . 3 5 8 3 0 . 0 0 2 4 . 6 3 4 5 1 . 0 3 1 
NACH 1 . 2 4 4 7 4 . 3 3 8 2 5 . 0 0 3 4 . 9 6 2 9 4 . 0 2 6 
GPA 1 . 5 3 0 5 7 . 3 1 3 4 7 . 0 0 4 7 . 0 0 9 2 4 . 0 0 3 
E F F O R T . 4 0 7 1 7 . 3 0 6 9 0 . 0 0 7 2 . 0 5 0 9 0 . 1 5 2 
FDBACK . 6 2 2 2 3 . 2 9 6 6 4 . 0 1 1 3 . 3 7 9 1 5 . 0 6 6 
ABLTYA . 4 8 2 0 2 . 2 8 8 4 6 . 0 1 7 2 . 0 6 7 5 2 . 0 9 0 
VALM0N2 . 2 8 0 2 5 . 2 8 3 5 0 . 0 2 9 1 . 3 2 1 6 4 . 177 
VALMON1 . 5 6 1 9 9 . 2 7 3 2 6 . 0 4 2 3 . 9 6 4 6 6 . 0 4 6 
DRCHG . 7 4 1 6 8 . 2 5 9 5 1 . 0 5 6 5 . 3 1 6 0 8 . 0 1 6 
S U M I V l . 6 0 2 5 6 . 2 4 8 0 2 . 0 7 7 5 . 3 5 8 2 0 . 0 2 1 
SEX 1 . 3 3 8 3 6 . 2 2 3 1 3 . 0 8 2 1 3 . 4 9 0 6 2 . 0 0 0 
I N S T R . 9 8 4 2 6 . 2 0 4 8 1 . 0 9 8 1 2 . 0 3 0 4 1 . 0 0 1 
-FDBACK . 0 0 1 2 4 . 2 0 4 8 3 . 0 5 8 - . 0 1 6 5 0 1 . 0 0 0 
E R R C R F . 8 9 6 1 7 . 1 8 9 4 0 . 0 7 3 1 1 . 9 3 2 4 1 . 0 0 1 
ANSTOT . 7 1 3 9 7 . 1 7 6 7 8 . 0 9 7 1 1 . 3 0 9 1 0 . 0 0 1 
ANSCRF 3 . 7 9 5 1 8 . 1 2 4 3 4 . 0 5 2 7 1 . 5 6 2 7 3 . 0 0 0 
I V A 2 . 6 2 0 2 6 . 0 9 3 6 6 . 0 4 0 7 9 . 0 2 3 4 2 . 0 0 0 
AGE . 4 8 3 6 5 . 0 3 7 6 1 . 0 6 7 2 2 . 1 2 9 8 9 . 0 0 0 
S U M I V 2 . 0 4 5 9 9 . 0 8 6 9 4 . 1 2 6 2 . 6 2 4 7 0 . 105 
FDBACK . 0 2 8 7 1 . 0 8 6 4 5 . 2 2 1 1 . 9 8 1 2 6 . 159 
DUMBER E I G E N V A L U E C A N . C O R R . P TRACE W I L K S 
0 1 0 . 5 6 7 5 9 . 9 5 5 8 0 1 0 0 . 0 . 0 8 6 4 5 
1 F U N C T I O N S W I L L BE USED I N R E M A I N I N G ANALYSES 
S T A N D A R D I Z E D D I S C R I M I N A N T F U N C T I O N C O E F F I C I E N T S 
1 
E F F O R T - 1 . 2 9 4 8 1 
EXPCTY 2 . 8 3 7 0 0 
I N S T Y - 2 . 3 3 5 1 6 
I V A 1 . 2 2 3 8 1 
I V B - 1 . 8 2 2 3 7 
NACH 4 . 9 3 8 5 9 
VALM0N1 - 8 . 0 3 1 3 4 
VALM0N2 5 . 8 1 8 0 5 
SEX 5 . 5 1 6 8 4 
C L A S S - . 4 5 3 3 1 
VALGAM1 - . 9 6 5 8 6 
VALGAM2 - . 6 7 7 9 1 
ABLTYA 5 . 8 0 2 3 6 
A B L T Y E - 6 . 5 2 2 2 6 
AGE . 8 5 9 5 1 
GPA - 1 . 9 1 0 1 6 
SUPPORT - . 8 1 2 4 1 
I N S T R . 6 9 3 2 1 
FDBACK - . 1 7 0 3 9 
DRCHG 3 . 8 6 3 8 3 
S U M I V l 7 . 3 2 4 5 3 
S U M I V 2 - . 8 3 1 2 8 
ANSCRF 1 8 . 9 5 7 3 3 
ANSTOT - 1 9 . 4 0 2 8 0 
E R R C R F - 1 3 . 1 0 0 0 0 
ERRTOT 1 4 . 2 3 3 8 2 
C E N T R O I D S OF GROUPS I N REDUCED S P A C E 
GROUP 1 
GROUP 2 
- 5 . 9 4 3 3 2 
1 . 6 6 5 5 3 
P R E D I C T I O N R E S U L T S -
ACTUAL GROUP N OF 
NAME CODE C A S E S 
GROUP 1 1 7 
GROUP 2 2 2 5 
P R E D I C T E D GROUP M E M B E R S H I P 
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 
7 . 0 
1 0 0 < OP OP 
0 2 5 . 
OP 1 0 0 . OP 
1 0 0 . 0 P E R C E N T OF KNOWN C A S E S CORRECTLY C L A S S I F I E D 
C H I - S O U A R E = 3 2 . 0 0 0 S I G N I F I C A N C E = . 0 0 0 
AUTO- MODE - RETURNED FROM S P S S . 
APPENDIX C 
MEAN RESPONSE CURVES 
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Figure 6. Mean Performance Curves for F-I Subjects 
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Figure 7. Mean Performance Curves for NF-I Subjects. 
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Figure 8. Mean Performance Curves for F-NI Subjects 
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Figure 9. Mean Performance Curves for NF-NI Subjects (no intervention) 
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APPENDIX D 
ANALYSIS OF TIME-SERIES DATA 
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APPENDIX D 
ANALYSIS OF TIME-SERIES DATA 
The present experiment utilized a "stratified Multiple 
Group-Single Intervention" design in which two groups were 
identified as receiving money or points as reinforcement. 
Both groups received the same intervention, the change from 
continuous reinforcement to a variable ratio schedule. The 
intervention is actually continuous in nature in that it is 
applied continuously over several points in time. The dis­
tinction between temporary versus continuous intervention 
becomes important in the interpretation of intervention 
effects. 
The Autoregressive-Integrated-Moving-Average (ARIMA) 
model (Box and Jenkins, 1970) was used to describe and analyze 
the data. The first step is to identify the model which best 
describes the data after its collection. In the ARIMA model, 
the observed time-series is regarded as having three basic 
properties: 1) the observed series is stationary or non-
stationary, and if the latter, there exists a degree of "dif­
ferencing" of the series required to produce stationarity, 
2) the order of the autoregressive component of the model, 
3) the order of the moving average component of the model. 
A stationary model remains in equilibrium around a 
constant mean level, although oscillations around this level 
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may not be random. If the series is not stationary, succes­
sive differences are taken until the resulting series is 
stationary. The degree of differencing needed is determined 
using an autocorrelation function, and is denoted as d. Box 
and Jenkins (197 0) note that d rarely needs to exceed values 
other than 0, 1, or 2. 
The autoregressive (p) and moving average (cr) components 
are determined partly from inference and examination of the 
data after d has been determined. The process of specify­
ing values for p and £ is described by Glass et al. (1975). 
Identification of these components of the underlying model 
requires the calculation of a correlation coefficient called 
the autocorrelation from the scatterplots of various "lags." 
The lag 1 scatterplot pairs observations with those that are 
lagged by one unit of time, i.e. Z t with z t + ^ * T ^ e ^"a9 ^ 
autocorrelation coefficient, r^, is then plotted along with 
other autocorrelation coefficients, ( r2' r 3 ' " * * r ] ^ t o P r o v i d e 
what is called the correlogram. For instance, a first-order 
moving averages model shows the lag correlation being nonzero 
and the autocorrelations for lags 2 and greater will be zero, 
within sampling error. 
The most common nonstationary ARIMA (p,d,q) model, 
and the model used in the present study, is ARIMA (0,1,1), 
which contains no autoregressive term, and the first dif­
ferences contain one moving averages term. The model is sug­
gested first by examining the data graph. The process should 
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show nonstationarity, wandering away from a given level for 
long periods of time rather than oscillating around a single 
level. The model is also recognizable by its correlogram, 
which does not die out to zero exponentially or abruptly. The 
autocorrelations of the undifferenced data remain large for 
large lags. Yet the first differences of the data are 
stationary. The correlogram must also show the moving aver­
ages property of having the lag 1 autocorrelation be nonzero 
while the autocorrelations for large lags are essentially zero. 
The ARIMA (0,1,1) model can be stated mathematically 
as: 
t-1 
Z = L + (1 - 9 ) I a + a 
i=l 
where = observation at time t 
L = true but unobserved level of the process at t=0 
2 
a^ = random shocks entering at time t=0 NID (0,a ) 
1 - 8 = proportion of shocks remaining in the system 
indefinitely 
After identification of the ARIMA model, the parameter 
0 ^ must be estimated from the observed time-series. It is 
possible to calculate 
.2 
SS = a.j 
where the minimum SS determines the maximum likelihood esti­
mates of 8^. A(l - a) percent confidence region is then 
given by 
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x „ ( p + q ) 
SS v(9) = [SS , , . , . ] [1 + ] . 
(1-a) calculated min. 1 N 1 
As mentioned previously, the present data was identi­
fied by an ARIMA (0,1,1) model. Yet due to the nature of the 
data for the present study, i.e. an aquisition curve, it be­
came apparent that the data did not fit the assumption of no 
systematic, non-stochastic trends of a probabilistic nature. 
This assumption is implicit in having a^ being normally and 
independently distributed with a mean of zero. In such a 
case, the random variable portion of the model can be allowed 
to assume an expected value other than zero, taking on the 
form, 
t=l 
z t = L + (1 + e 1 ) I b ± + b t., 
i=l 
2 
where b is a normal variable with variance and mean equal 
to u.. The parameter u is related to the rate of ascent or 
descent of the time-series. b can be thought of as u + a. 
It is then possible to test for both changes in the determin­
istic drift as well as changes in level at the point of inter­
vention. If the above equation is descriptive of the n^ 
observations before intervention, then the n 2 observations 
after intervention can be described by 
t-1 
Z. = L + (1 + 9 n ) T (b.+ A ) + (b. + A ) + 9 t 1 . L , 1 t 1=1 
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where d = the change of level of the series between time 
n^ and n^ + 1 
A = the change in the mean of the random errors be­
tween these two times. 
Prior to intervention, the series drifts at a rate of (1-0) 
units for each unit of time. After intervention, the series 
drifts (1 - 0 ^ ) . (y +A) units on the average for each unit 
of time. 
Glass et al. (1975) make some suggestions which were 
also considered before collection and analysis of the data. 
They suggest that at least 50 data points be collected to 
identify the ARIMA model with some confidence. The large 
sample size does not increase the power of the tests directly 
but allows the dependence among the observations to be ac­
counted for. In the present study, observations were recor­
ded at 30 second intervals, providing a total of 110 observa­
tions, 7 0 prior to intervention. 
Programs CORREL and TSX (Bower, Padia, and Glass,1974), 
were used to analyze the time-series observations from the 
64 subjects used in this study. CORREL was used in the iden­
tification of the model appropriate for the time-series. The 
program subjects the time-series data to a correlogram and 
partial autocorrelation analysis. Inspection of the output 
and the data graphs suggested the ARIMA (0,1,1) model. To 
verify this choice, a random sample of time-series cases was 
selected and run through CORREL with the option included to 
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provide the residuals. 
These residuals were in turn run through CORREL to provide 
the autocorrelations and correlogram. If the correct model 
had been identified, the residuals should be uncorrelated, 
indicated by a non-significant chi-square statistic. This 
implies that the residual are white noise and that the model 
was correctly fit. In all cases tested, the data indicated 
that the (0,1,1) model was appropriate. 
Each of the 64 time-series sets was then run through 
TSX, a Fortran IV program which analyzes time-series data 
with intervention. A design matrix constructed by the program 
performs a standard least-squares regression of the observa­
tions onto the 11 independent variables" of the design matrix. 
The initial design matrix is multiplied by an appropriate 
function to construct the actual design matrix used in the 
regression. A complete least-squares analysis is performed 
for increments of .02 between +1 and -1 for 9^. Options were 
used to estimate the change in the level, drift, and change 
in drift. 
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